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CAUGHT OFF-BALANCE: HOW 
IMPLEMENTING STRUCTURAL CHANGES TO 
STATE BALANCED BUDGET REQUIREMENTS 
CAN FOSTER FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY AND 
PROMOTE LONG-TERM ECONOMIC HEALTH 
Abstract: Although forty-nine states have balanced budget requirements, states 
still consistently face massive budgetary shortfalls. Many states face serious en-
forcement issues, leaving the states vulnerable to violations of their balanced 
budget requirements through budgetary manipulation and gimmicks. Although 
not easily resolved, these problems could be mitigated or settled entirely through 
the use of alternative balanced budget systems. This Note explores the problems 
and gimmicks that cripple the effectiveness of state balanced budget require-
ments. This Note then proposes alternative balanced budget requirement struc-
tures that could alleviate many of these problems. In particular, this Note argues 
that cyclical-based budgets, reality-based budgeting, and alternative enforcement 
mechanisms could lead states toward sustained economic success. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1998, tobacco companies settled lawsuits with forty-six states, agreeing 
to pay annual payments expected to total $256 billion over the next twenty-five 
years.1 The states agreed to use the entirety of these funds for the explicit pur-
pose of attacking the health problems caused by tobacco, including medical re-
search for tobacco related illnesses and tobacco-use prevention campaigns in 
schools.2 The states, however, have failed to uphold this promise.3 In 2013, the 
states only used 1.8% of their tobacco settlement money on tobacco related pro-
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Broken Promises to Our Children: The 1998 State Tobacco Settlement 14 Years Later, 
CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS, at i (Dec. 6, 2012) [hereinafter CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-
FREE KIDS], http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/content/what_we_do/state_local_issues/settlement/FY
2013/1.%202012%20State%20Report%20-%20Full.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/2EJA-4BN2. 
 2 See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL: TOBACCO MASTER SETTLEMENT 25 
(1998), available at http://publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/default/files/resources/master-settlement-
agreement.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/LHU5-U9H4 (setting aside funds for a foundation to study 
and prevent tobacco related diseases and reduce youth tobacco usage); CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-
FREE KIDS, supra note 1, at i (stating that states had promised to use a significant portion of their 
settlement funds to attack health problems surrounding tobacco usage). 
 3 See CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS, supra note 1, at i (stating that, despite their promis-
es, only 1.8% of the tobacco settlement funds went to tobacco related programs in the fiscal year 
2013). 
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grams—approximately two cents for every dollar received from the settlement.4 
In fact, 36% of tobacco programs were cut during the 2008–2012 period, not-
withstanding continued receipt of the settlement money.5 
Instead of using the money to address tobacco-related illnesses, state gov-
ernments have used the money to help alleviate budget deficits.6 States directed 
the money to sources that would help bridge their budgetary shortfalls, including 
placing the money in the general operating fund or into funds unrelated to tobac-
co.7 For example, despite statutory requirements to the contrary, New Mexico 
has diverted upwards of an estimated $150 million from a permanent tobacco 
settlement fund to replace general revenue funds.8 Another state, New York, 
has allocated all $800 million of its tobacco settlement funds into its general 
operating budget, to be used however the legislature determines.9 These states 
exemplify a larger pattern of states consistently misusing funds to supplement 
their own budgetary shortcomings.10 
Although forty-nine states have balanced budgetary requirements, these 
requirements generally have proved ineffective in actually producing balanced 
budgets.11 Within the past few years, the economic downturn has created severe 
budgetary shortfalls for most states.12 Between 2009 and 2012, the combined 
                                                                                                                           
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Cory Eucalitto, Tobacco Settlement Fund Gimmicks Alive and Well, STATE BUDGET SOLU-
TIONS (Apr. 15, 2013), http://www.statebudgetsolutions.org/publications/detail/tobacco-settlement-
fund-gimmicks-alive-and-well, archived at http://perma.cc/T67W-ZZMU. 
 7 Id. (describing state misuse of tobacco settlement funds, including using them to replace general 
fund revenues). 
 8 Id. (stating that, in 2000, New Mexico required that fifty percent of the Tobacco Settlement 
Funds be sent to a permanent fund, but that number has only been reached four out of eight years, 
costing the fund millions). 
 9 Id. (stating that New York legislators have placed the funds in the general operating fund, mak-
ing it more difficult to trace how they are used). 
 10 See generally Corey Eucalitto, Unbalanced: Why State Balanced Budget Requirements Are Not 
Enough, STATE BUDGET SOLUTIONS (Apr. 4, 2013), http://www.statebudgetsolutions.org/doclib/
20130403_UnbalancedPDF.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/3EXL-KLST (concluding that states’ 
budgetary problems have been a direct cause of misuse of funds and budgetary gimmicks to mask 
fiscal problems). 
 11 David Gamage, Preventing State Budget Crises: Managing the Fiscal Volatility Problem, 98 
CALIF. L. REV. 749, 749 (2010) (labeling recent years as a “fiscal rollercoaster” in describing the re-
cent boom and bust of state budgets); Phil Oliff et al., States Continue to Feel Recession’s Impact, 
CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES 2–3 (June 27, 2012), available at http://www.cbpp.org/cms/
index.cfm?fa=view&id=711, archived at http://perma.cc/SPE9-BJL7 (tracing state budget gaps 
through the last decade). 
 12 See Oliff et al., supra note 11, at 1; see also Elizabeth McNichol, Out of Balance: Cuts in Ser-
vices Have Been States’ Primary Response to Budget Gaps, Harming the Nation’s Economy, CTR. ON 
BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES 3 (Apr. 18, 2012), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/4-18-12sfp.
pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/RP36-LRCP. Budgetary shortfalls occur when a state’s expenditures 
and costs of providing services exceed its revenue. Oliff et al., supra note 11, at 1. During the 2005–
2007 period, at least thirty-five states reported budgetary deficits running multiple years. INST. FOR 
TRUTH IN ACCOUNTING, The Truth About Balanced Budgets: A Fifty State Study, STATE DATA LAB 25 
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budgetary shortfalls for states totaled more than 540 billion dollars.13 Despite 
recent economic growth, states still experience sharp budgetary shortfalls.14 
Today, most states still face large shortfalls and numerous obstacles to re-
covery.15 Thirty-one states faced shortfalls totaling $55 billion over the 2013 
fiscal year.16 Meanwhile, revenue growth has not recovered enough to offset 
these shortfalls.17 Even states that initially survived the economic downturn, 
such as resource rich New Mexico, Alaska, and Montana, now face budgetary 
concerns as revenue dwindles.18  
                                                                                                                           
(Feb. 2009) [hereinafter ITA, The Truth About Balanced Budgets], http://www.statedatalab.org/
library/doclib/50_State_Final_2008.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/UT9A-AU7J. 
 13 McNichol, supra note 12, at 3 (estimating the combined shortfall from the 2008–2012 period at 
around $595.3 billion); Oliff et al., supra note 11, at 2. 
 14 Oliff et al., supra note 11, at 2. State revenue growths remain sluggish, as they were still more 
than 5% below their pre-recession levels, as of 2012. Id. Meanwhile expenditures continue to swell as 
high-priced services such as health care and education continue to grow. See, e.g., NAT’L CTR. FOR 
EDUC. STATISTICS, THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION 2012 (May 2012), available at http://nces.ed.gov/
pubs2012/2012045.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/6KH7-ZN24 (tables showing that states expect to 
educate 540,000 more K-12 students and 2.5 million more college-level students than in 2007–2008); 
Oliff et al., supra note 11, at 2 (explaining that 4.8 million more people are projected to be eligible for 
Medicaid in 2012 than in 2008, due to employers cancelling plans and employees losing jobs and 
wages); Total Number of Medicare Beneficiaries, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., http://kff.org/
medicare/state-indicator/total-medicare-beneficiaries/, archived at http://perma.cc/P22X-6GNV (last 
visited Jan. 16, 2015) (showing that the total number of Medicare beneficiaries has increased in every 
state between 2008 and 2012). 
 15 Oliff et al., supra note 11, at 4; State Budget Shortfalls, SFY2013, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY 
FOUND., http://kff.org/other/state-indicator/state-budget-shortfalls-sfy13/, archived at http://perma.cc/
XF8P-M8KH (last accessed Jan. 16, 2015). 
 16 Oliff et al., supra note 11, at 4 (noting that although this number may not be as large as those in 
the past few years, these shortfalls remain extraordinarily high historically, especially since four years 
have passed since the recession ended); State Budget Shortfalls, supra note 15.  
 17 See McNichol, supra note 12, at 10. Even if revenues maintained their 2011 growth levels, most 
states would not expect their revenues to recover fully from the recession until 2019. Id. Yet, revenue 
growth has not even been able to maintain that ambitious target, as reports have shown that growth 
slowed in 2012 and 2013. Id.; see also The Fiscal Survey of States: An Update of State Fiscal Condi-
tions, NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N & NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS (Fall 2011), available 
at http://www.nasbo.org/sites/default/files/2011%20Fall%20Fiscal%20Survey%20of%20States.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/R4MA-ZRXB (demonstrating states’ projected growth of less than 2% for 
the full year on average); Lucy Dadayan, Data Alert: States Post Another Strong Quarter in Tax Col-
lections, NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER INST. OF GOV’T (Dec. 8, 2011), available at http://www.rockinst.
org/newsroom/data_alerts/2011/12-08.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/4APL-FLNS (showing reve-
nue growth of only 2.7% in the second financial quarter of 2012). 
 18 Oliff et al., supra note 11, at 4 (explaining that the decline in oil prices has led to a drop in 
revenue in these states); see Taylor Riggs, Oil Price Drop Deals Blow to Some State Budgets, 
BLOOMBERG, Dec. 5, 2014, http://briefs.blpprofessional.com/viz/Oil-Price-Drop-Deals-a-Blow-to-
Some-State-Budgets/index.html?hootPostID=7cb8c6e78a6e696ac3ae9d1f4c22dad2, archived at http://
perma.cc/3DZ3-TMDG (providing graphical representations of falling oil prices and their effect on 
the state budgets on oil-producing states). 
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The size and prevalence of these deficits have galvanized a national dis-
course concerning governmental fiscal responsibility.19 This Note assesses many 
of the problems experienced by current state balanced budget requirements and 
proposes structural changes that can be used to ameliorate many of the most per-
vasive issues.20 Part I explains balanced budget requirements and how they 
commonly operate across the country.21This Part further identifies some of the 
alternative elements that could be used to solve many problems facing state 
budgets.22 Part II highlights many of the problems afflicting the states balanced 
budget attempts, including the numerous gimmicks relied upon by lawmakers.23 
Finally, Part III argues that the implementation of transparency measures, stricter 
enforcement mechanisms, and more flexible timelines can be instrumental in 
solving many of these serious budgetary problems.24 
                                                                                                                           
 19 Balanced Budget Amendment: Pros and Cons, PETER G. PETERSON FOUND. 1 (June 21, 2012), 
http://pgpf.org/sites/default/files/sitecore/media%20library/PGPF/Articles/PDF/062112-Balanced-
Budget-Explainer.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/42WR-PFFX (discussing the debate surrounding 
the introduction of a federal balanced budget amendment); see Alan Greenblatt, After 15 Years, GOP 
Revives Balanced Budget Idea, NPR, Aug. 2, 2011, http://www.npr.org/2011/08/02/138900281/after-
15-years-gop-revives-balanced-budget-idea, archived at http://perma.cc/AXC5-2Z4Z (concluding that 
polls indicate a majority of the American population support stronger fiscal controls on government 
spending). The frequency of massive governmental deficits has even sparked a national debate about 
amending the U.S. Constitution to include a federal balanced budget amendment. See Shane Nichols, 
Comment, A Balanced Budget Amendment Fit for the Constitution: The Elimination of Partisanship 
and Substantive Provisions, 46 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 583, 584 (2013) (predicting that public senti-
ment will inevitably demand and lead to the introduction of a federal balanced budget amendment). 
Although the federal government does not currently have any balanced budget mandate, there have 
frequently been calls to put one in place on a federal level. See Theodore P. Seto, Drafting a Federal 
Balanced Budget Amendment That Does What It Is Supposed to Do (and No More), 106 YALE L.J. 
1449, 1451 (1997) (addressing the numerous attempts in recent history to propose a federal balanced 
budget constitutional amendment); see also Daniel N. Shaviro, Reckless Disregard: The Bush Admin-
istration’s Policy of Cutting Taxes in the Face of an Enormous Fiscal Gap, 45 B.C. L. REV. 1285, 1287 
(2004) (explaining the strength of the balanced budget amendment movement and noting that in 1995 a 
balanced budget amendment proposal passed the House and fell one vote shy in the Senate). Led by a 
strong conservative movement, the argument is that only with a constitutional mandate can government 
spending be reined in and fiscal responsibility take priority. Nichols, supra at 584. Although many sup-
porters for the federal amendment point to the states as examples of the feasibility of an amendment, they 
ignore the multi-billion dollar deficits most states have accrued despite their balanced budget require-
ments. Compare Orrin Hatch, Balanced Budget Amendment Would Have Prevented Current Mess, 
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 23, 2011, http://www.usnews.com/debate-club/does-the-united-
states-need-a-balanced-budget-amendment/balanced-budget-amendment-would-have-prevented-
current-mess, archived at http://perma.cc/2Y6W-9F6D (reasoning that because states were able to use 
balanced budget amendments, it should likewise work on a federal level), with Oliff et al., supra note 
11, at 4 (reporting that thirty-five states in 2013 have a budget shortfall, totaling over $55 billion). 
 20 See infra notes 140–284 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 25–90 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 91–139 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 140–194 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 195–284 and accompanying text. 
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I. THE BALANCING ACT: UNDERSTANDING STATE BALANCED  
BUDGET REQUIREMENTS  
Although each state’s balanced budget system is unique, understanding the 
schemes in terms of their common foundational principles is key to identifying 
their underlying problems.25 Typically, state balanced budget amendments are 
conceived as sets of rules constricting the budget process at several key junc-
tions.26 State balanced budget requirements are generally best understood as a 
scheme involving numerous pieces throughout the state political and administra-
tive structure.27 These provisions guide every stage of budget implementation.28 
This Part explains how states generally understand their balanced budget 
requirements and how they have chosen to structure them.29 Section A presents 
an explanation of how states understand a “balanced budget” in terms of their 
own balanced budget requirements.30 Section B describes the general processes 
shared by state balanced budget systems.31 Section C then outlines several alter-
native budgetary tactics that are not widely used.32 
                                                                                                                           
 25 See Eucalitto, supra note 10; Yilin Hou & Daniel L. Smith, A Framework for Understanding 
State Balanced Budget Requirement Systems: Reexamining Distinctive Features and an Operational 
Definition, 26 PUB. BUDGETING & FIN. 22, 43–44 (Aug. 2006). 
 26 Eucalitto, supra note 10. 
 27 Id. Various roles between the governor, the different legislative houses, local governments, and 
administrative bodies necessitate these complex schemes. See, e.g., Bob Lang & Sandy Swain, State 
Budget Process, WIS. LEGISLATIVE FISCAL BUREAU 2 (Jan. 2013), available at http://legis.wisconsin.
gov/lfb/publications/informational-papers/documents/2013/74_state%20budget%20process.pdf, ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/Q8AB-AC63 (describing the budgetary cycle and the numerous parties in-
volved); The State Budget Process, STATE OF N.J. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, http://www.state.nj.us/
treasury/omb/ReadersGuide/budgetprocess.shtml, (last visited Jan. 16, 2015), archived at http://
perma.cc/2PN7-NVLC (describing the various interactions amongst several government bodies 
through the budgetary process of New Jersey); Summary of the Steps in the Budgetary Process, MASS. 
OFFICE FOR ADMIN. & FIN., http://www.mass.gov/anf/budget-taxes-and-procurement/state-budget/
budget-process/summary-of-the-steps-in-the-budget-process.html, archived at http://perma.cc/3STU-
R8BE (last visited Jan. 16, 2015) (describing the budgetary process of Massachusetts as involving 
steps engaging multiple levels of government); see also How States Budget for Capital, U.S. NAT’L 
ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN. (Oct. 22, 1998), http://clinton4.nara.gov/pcscb/staf_states.html, ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/XL89-NJEL (describing numerous actors involved in the budgetary system 
that has led to differences amongst the states’ various budgetary structures). 
 28 Eucalitto, supra note 10. This complicated structure is necessary because of the numerous 
stages of the budgetary process, including the preparation, approval, and implementation of the budg-
etary cycle. Yilin Hou & Daniel L. Smith, Do State Balanced Budget Requirements Matter? Testing 
Two Explanatory Frameworks, 145 PUB. CHOICE 57, 57 (2010). 
 29 See infra notes 33–139 and accompanying text. 
 30 See infra notes 33–44 and accompanying text. 
 31 See infra notes 45–90 and accompanying text. 
 32 See infra notes 91–139 and accompanying text. 
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A. Back to Basics: Defining Balanced Budget 
Balancing budgets is a basic, but important, government function.33 Gener-
ally, a balanced budget is one where the government’s revenue meets its expend-
itures.34 The process of balancing a budget requires estimating the revenues for 
the upcoming year and adjusting projected expenditures to ensure that govern-
ment spending does not exceed its revenues.35 The budget process is imperative 
to any government because it represents the goals and objectives of government 
officials, and provides a source of public accountability.36 
When states balance their budgets, the process generally refers only to the 
states’ operating budgets.37 Most state governments have separate operating and 
capital budgets.38 State budgeting processes do not seek to balance the entire 
                                                                                                                           
 33 See ITA, The Truth About Balanced Budgets, supra note 12, at 1 (discussing the importance of 
budget-balancing procedures to government operation and the government-public relationship). 
 34 See id. (explaining that balanced budgets involve the relationship of government resources to 
the expected expenditures). 
 35 Id. (discussing the importance of accurate estimates of projected revenues and expenditures in 
creating a balanced budget). 
 36 Id. State balanced budget requirements emerged out of the recession sparked by the Panic of 
1837 and were largely created as limits on a state’s ability to issue debt. RUDOLPH G. PENNER & MI-
CHAEL WEISNER, DO STATE BUDGET RULES AFFECT WELFARE SPENDING? 3–4 (Urban Inst. 2001), 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/occa43.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/2LZE-3DVN; Eucalitto, 
supra note 10. Rhode Island passed the first balanced budget amendment in 1843; by 1900, thirty-
seven states had followed suit. Penner & Weisner, supra at 4. 
 37 NCSL Fiscal Brief: State Balanced Budget Provisions, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGIS-
LATURES 6 (Oct. 2010) [hereinafter NCSL Fiscal Brief] http://www.ncsl.org/documents/fiscal/
StateBalancedBudgetProvisions2010.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/DD2M-3VYX. An operating 
budget is one that covers current regular expenses, such as salaries, as opposed to capital expenditures, 
which are unusual expenditures, such as long-term construction projects. Brendan Koerner, How Are 
State Balanced Budget Laws Enforced?, SLATE.COM (June 27, 2003, 5:54 PM), http://www.slate.
com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2003/06/how_are_state_balanced_budget_laws_enforced.
html, archived at http://perma.cc/8EJX-EHDF. States define their operating budget as all other ex-
penditures other than capital expenditures, whereas the capital budget is expenditures devoted to the 
acquisition or addition to fixed assets. See Glossary, MICH. STATE BUDGET OFFICE (last visited Jan. 
16, 2015), http://www.michigan.gov/budget/0,4538,7-157-11460_11541---,00.html, archived at http://
perma.cc/93AJ-QJB6. Thus, the operating budget generally includes expenditures like salaries and 
wages, aid to local governments, health and welfare benefits, and other annual outlays, while exclud-
ing such expenditures as construction and land purchases. State Balanced Budget Requirements: Ex-
ecutive Summary, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Apr. 12, 1996) [hereinafter NCSL 
Executive Summary], http://www.ncsl.org/research/fiscal-policy/state-balanced-budget-requirements.
aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/BP7L-8Y46. Either those provisions specify how to pay for capital 
expenditures through general obligation debt or judicial decisions have validated other methods of issu-
ing debt to cover those expenditures. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 41-10-268.1 (2013 & Supp. 2014) (allow-
ing the issuance of bonds for capital expenditures, provided they do not rise above $10 million); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 5-12-214 (2011) (allowing long-term debt to finance capital expenditures); In re 
Okla. Capitol Improvement Auth., 80 P.3d 109, 115 (Okla. 2003) (invalidating the issuance of bonds 
because they failed to enumerate that they were for capital expenditure). 
 38 NCSL Fiscal Brief, supra note 37, at 7. This is a different system than the federal government, 
which combines operating and capital budgets. Id. 
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state budget.39 Operating budgets are generally funded through tax revenues 
and make up the majority of legislative appropriations.40 By contrast, capital 
expenditures are unusual payments, such as long-term construction projects.41 
As most legislative appropriations are made from the general fund, the op-
erating budget often receives great public and political attention.42 This attention 
renders the operating budget the subject of the greatest scrutiny.43 The operating 
budget garners additional attention because it has fewer limitations than other 
types of funds.44 
B. The Operation of State Balanced Budget Requirements 
States share many common characteristics in how their budget process is 
built and operates.45 This Section outlines how state balanced budget require-
ments generally operate. 46 Subsection 1 highlights the common stages of the 
budgetary process.47 Subsection 2 describes several key foundational character-
istics common amongst the state balanced budget systems.48 
                                                                                                                           
 39 Id. at 6. Operating budgets, however, are not entirely funded through tax revenues, as states can 
draw from other sources, such as placing the funds from the Tobacco Settlement into general operat-
ing funds. See Eucalitto, supra note 6. 
 40 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-93-58, BALANCED BUDGET REQUIREMENTS: 
STATE EXPENDITURES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 3 (Mar. 1993), available 
at http://archive.gao.gov/d44t15/148877.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/T6YG-QAKB; NCSL Fiscal 
Brief, supra note 37, at 1. Appropriations are a sum of money or assets taken out for a specified pur-
pose. Appropriation, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/appropriation, ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/KDH4-APU4 (last visited Jan. 18, 2015). The state general fund also in-
cludes revenue from general tax receipts, fee collections, discretionary appropriations, and other miscel-
laneous revenue. NCSL Fiscal Brief, supra note 37, at 6. 
 41 NCSL Fiscal Brief, supra note 37, at 6. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. at 7. 
 44 Id. at 6. Other funds are subject to few political decisions because they are so restricted as to 
what they can be used for. Id. For example, federal funds are generally designated for a specific pur-
pose from which a state cannot deviate. Id. Not only do few decisions arise outside of the general 
fund, but state legislators generally have very little discretion over the decisions that do with these 
funds. Id. For example, some tax collections can be directly distributed without going through the 
appropriations process, and some state agencies and universities are allowed to collect their own funds 
without going through the appropriations process. Id. Since these expenditures are controlled almost 
entirely with available funds, it is highly unlikely for them to be “out of balance,” which shifts the 
focus away from them in terms of balancing the budget. See id. 
 45 Hou & Smith, supra note 25, at 23. States share many political and technical rules used to craft 
their budgets as well as common structural characteristics, such as timelines and budgetary techniques. 
Id.  
 46 See infra notes 49–90 and accompanying text. 
 47 See infra notes 49–73 and accompanying text. 
 48 See infra notes 74–90 and accompanying text. 
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1. The General Operation of State Balanced Budget Requirements  
Although no state budgetary system is exactly alike, most share common 
characteristics of how the budget is produced and approved.49 These characteris-
tics emanate from the rules governing the executive preparation, legislative re-
view, and implementation of the budgetary process.50 Looking at the common 
elements among the state systems in this way creates a framework to understand 
the way these provisions work.51 
The general framework of state balanced budget amendments is a series of 
rules working together at alternating stages of the process.52 The initial require-
ment mandates that the governor submit a balanced budget proposal.53 The typi-
cal version of this requirement has the governor approve a general appropria-
                                                                                                                           
 49 Hou & Smith, supra note 25, at 23. 
 50 Id. It is important to look at both the political and technical rules governing balanced budget 
provisions, because both are of a different nature and govern different aspects of the process. Id. Polit-
ical rules are more concerned with the budgetary procedure and are generally more ambiguous and 
subject to manipulation or circumvention. Id. Meanwhile, technical rules are concerned with the sub-
stantive aspect with regard to budgetary balance, use of debt, controls on supplementary appropria-
tions, and deficits in order to achieve balance. Id. These technical rules are generally more straight-
forward, rigid, and difficult to circumvent than the political rules. Id. 
 51 Id. The development of this kind of framework was born in response to the traditional under-
standing of state balanced budget requirements. Compare Budget Processes in the States, NAT’L 
ASS’N OF BUDGET OFFICERS 40 (Summer 2008) [hereinafter 2008 NASBO Report], https://www.
nasbo.org/sites/default/files/BP_2008.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/48LR-3ADB (presenting the 
traditional understanding of balanced budget requirements), with Hou & Smith, supra note 25, at 33–
34 (describing the new categorization of state balanced budget requirements). The traditional under-
standing focused only on the political rules and relied on state self-reporting for characterization. 2008 
NASBO Report, supra at 40. This system faced mounting criticism that ignoring the technical rules 
led to a less-then-complete picture of the actual status of balanced budget requirements and that rely-
ing on state self-reporting led to inaccurate data. Hou & Smith, supra note 25, at 24 (blaming previous 
studies’ reliance on states’ self-reporting for the discrepancies between results); Eucalitto, supra note 
10 (describing the criticisms leveled against this traditional system, such as its over-simplicity, overre-
liance on political requirements and consequently ignoring technical requirements, and the irrelevance 
of some factors to the final budget outcome). The new framework was developed in hopes of creating 
a more comprehensive and accurate picture by taking qualitative and empirical data from every stage 
of the budgetary process. Hou & Smith, supra note 25, at 27. 
 52 See Hou & Smith, supra note 25, at 30, 35 (outlining the nine different political and technical 
rules that make up the framework of balanced budget requirements). 
 53 See id. at 34–35 (listing eleven states as having a constitutional provision and thirty-three states 
as having a statutory provision); 2008 NASBO Report, supra note 51, at 40 (listing forty-four states as 
having this provision). Although most states have, in practice, required the governor to sign the budg-
et after it has been prepared, the frequency with which that requirement is actually present in the laws 
is controversial. Compare Hou & Smith, supra note 25, at 34–35 (claiming that only two states have 
such requirements), with 2008 NASBO Report, supra note 51, at 40 (claiming that thirty-seven states 
reported that the governor is required to sign). 
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tions bill.54 Some states, without explicit requirements, have expected the gov-
ernor to submit a balanced budget.55  
Next, in the submitted budget, revenue must meet expected expenditures.56 
In addition to a balanced budget being submitted, the legislature must also pass 
a balanced budget.57 Most states allow the use of “other resources,” such as 
debt, to defray the cost of expenditures.58 Many states offset this flexibility, 
however, by capping the amount of debt that can be assumed for the purposes 
of deficit reduction during a given year.59 Finally, before the budget is enacted, 
many states expect that the governor sign the resulting budget.60 
After a budget is enacted, there are still several rules in place that govern 
its operation.61 One of the most important in determining the flexibility of the 
balanced budget requirement is whether or not the state allows a deficit to be 
carried over to the next fiscal year.62 Although many states report an understand-
ing of such a requirement, many states do not demand it.63 Alternatively, some 
                                                                                                                           
 54 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 29, § 6E (2013 & Supp. 2014) (requiring the governor to sub-
mit a general appropriation bill); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 35-3-7 (2011 & Supp. 2013) (same). 
 55 Compare ALA. CODE § 41-19-4 (2013 & Supp. 2014) (failing to require the governor to submit 
a budget proposal), with id. § 41-4-88 (stipulating guidelines to the governor with the assumption that 
he or she will submit a budget proposal); compare S.C. CONST. art. X, § 7 (requiring that the General 
Assembly provide a balanced budget proposal), with 2008 NASBO Report, supra note 51, at 40 (in-
terpreting the South Carolina Constitution as requiring the governor to submit the budget proposal). 
 56 See, e.g., HAW. CONST. art. 7, § 5; S.D. CONST. art. 11, § 1; GA. CODE ANN. § 45-12-75 (2002 
& Supp. 2014). Twelve states have either a statutory or constitutional provision of this nature. Hou & 
Smith, supra note 25, at 35. To that end, most states mandate that the revenue and debt must combine to 
meet expected expenditures in the planned budget. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. 9, § 10; N.Y. CONST. 
art. 7, § 9; OR. REV. STAT. § 291.216(2) (2013). Thirty-nine states have either a statutory or constitu-
tional provision of this nature. Hou & Smith, supra note 25, at 35. 
 57 See Hou & Smith, supra note 25, 34–35 (identifying twenty-seven states as having a constitu-
tional provision and eighteen states as having a statutory provision); 2008 NASBO Report, supra note 
51, at 40 (listing forty-one states as having this provision). 
 58 See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. X, § 2 (“The general assembly shall provide . . . an annual tax 
sufficient, with other resources, to defray the estimated expenses . . . .”); KY. CONST. § 171 (allowing 
other resources combined with taxes to be used to balance the budget against expenditures). 
 59 See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. 9, § 5 (capping the amount of debt that can be assumed for purpos-
es of deficit reduction at $350,000); ILL. CONST. art. 9, § 9 (capping the amount of debt usable for 
deficit reduction at no more than fifteen percent of the State’s appropriations for a given year); NEV. 
CONST. art. 9, § 3 (keeping the debt limit for deficits proportional to the value of property in the state). 
Twenty-two states have either a constitutional or statutory provision of this nature. Hou & Smith, 
supra note 25, at 35. 
 60 See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. 4, § 12; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 29, § 6E. Although only two states 
explicitly have this provision written in, many more states self-report behaving as though such a pro-
vision existed. Hou & Smith, supra note 25, at 35, 40. 
 61 Hou & Smith, supra note 25, at 35. 
 62 See id. at 34–35 (noting that two states have a constitutional provision and nine states have a 
statutory provision preventing a deficit carryover); 2008 NASBO Report, supra note 51, at 40 (listing 
seven states as having this provision). Its unpopularity amongst the states has been linked to the little 
room it leaves for budgetary circumvention. Hou & Smith, supra note 25, at 42. 
 63 Hou & Smith, supra note 25, at 42. 
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states do not allow deficits to be carried over into the next fiscal year.64 These 
statutes can vary greatly depending on local needs and the state’s goals.65 A re-
lated rule is whether the state can re-budget during the fiscal year to accommo-
date supplementary appropriations.66 This rule can be a powerful counterbalance 
to the political machinations of the executive or legislative branch.67 
Massachusetts represents a near-ideal state for studying how this frame-
work operates.68 The state constitution, in conjunction with several statutes, re-
quires that the governor pass a balanced budget.69 First, the governor must sub-
mit a proposed budget, in which he sets forth all expenditures, revenues, and 
other means of defraying the expenditures.70 The legislature then must pass the 
proposed budget in the form of a general appropriations bill, which includes a 
balanced budget.71 Any deficiencies in revenue require the governor to reduce 
spending or propose additional sources of revenue.72 The major state funds con-
trolled under these provisions are the State General Fund, Highway Fund, Lot-
teries Fund, and School Building Authority.73  
2. Additional, More Obscure Characteristics of State Balanced Budget 
Requirements 
Although this framework, exemplified by Massachusetts in the above ex-
ample, provides insight into the common methods by which states produce a 
budget and the limits they place on those budgets, there are several other note-
worthy characteristics of state balanced budget requirements that are outside the 
                                                                                                                           
 64 See id. at 34–35 (identifying six states as having constitutional requirements and twenty-nine 
states having statutory requirements of this nature). 
 65 Compare FLA. STAT. ANN. § 216.195 (West 2010 & Supp. 2012) (demanding that the state 
government generally avoid unnecessary appropriations), with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27B-31 (West 
2010 & Supp. 2014) (granting the governor discretion to prohibit or grant expenditures that may in-
crease the deficit throughout the fiscal year). 
 66 See ALA. CONST. art. XI, § 213; see also Hou & Smith, supra note 25, at 34–35 (listing seven 
states as having such a constitutional provision and fourteen states having a statutory one). 
 67 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 29, § 6E (2013 & Supp. 2014) (prohibiting the governor from ap-
proving any supplementary appropriations bill that would disrupt the balance). These rules can also be 
more flexible to allow for more discretion. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48.630 (2007 & Supp. 2014) 
(allowing the governor, with approval of the Finance and Administration Cabinet, to approve supple-
mentary appropriations bills in certain situations). 
 68 See Hou & Smith, supra note 25, at 35 (showing Massachusetts as having the most characteris-
tics of the new framework). 
 69 MASS. CONST. art. 63 § 2 (requiring the governor to submit a budget plan); MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ch. 29, § 6E (“No supplementary appropriation bill shall be approved by the governor which would 
cause the state budget for any fiscal year not to be balanced.”); id., ch. 29, § 9C (requiring the gover-
nor to reduce spending or propose ways to generate additional revenue when there is a deficiency). 
 70 Hou & Smith, supra note 25, at 35–36. 
 71 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 29, § 6E. 
 72 Id., ch. 29 § 9C. However, Massachusetts does not forbid the carrying over of deficits from one 
fiscal year to the next. ITA, The Truth About Balanced Budgets, supra note 12, at 74. 
 73 ITA, The Truth About Balanced Budgets, supra note 12, at 74. 
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scope of the general framework.74Although not included in this general budget 
production framework, state budget enforcement mechanisms, conventional 
budgeting techniques, and year-based structures are still three important aspects 
of state budget systems.75 These three elements can be used to study the effec-
tiveness of the requirements, the technique behind budgetary crafting, and the 
time structure behind the budgetary process.76 
One characteristic of state balanced budget processes that operates outside 
of the process framework is the use of conventional budgeting to determine what 
money should go where.77 State legislatures and governors rely on the technique 
known as conventional budgeting to determine the allocations of budgetary 
funds.78 By this method, budget-makers look at what existing programs need to 
continue functioning over the next year.79 Each program that received funding in 
the previous year receives similar time and focus, regardless of size and scope.80 
The baseline budget for that program results from this analysis.81 It is a num-
bers-focused process, where effectiveness and demand for existing programs are 
rarely considered by the budget-makers.82 The overall budget is then produced 
from the combination of these programs.83 
Although another mechanism of balanced budget procedures—enforce-
ment—is critical to fulfilling the promise of any law, the states have not reached 
                                                                                                                           
 74 See Hou & Smith, supra note 25, at 35. 
 75 See Donald B. Tobin, The Balanced Budget Amendment: Will Judges Become Accountants? A 
Look at State Experiences, 12 J.L. & POL. 153, 155 (1996) (explaining the importance of enforcing provi-
sions by highlighting the ineffectiveness and failure of enforcement); Bob Williams, Reality-Based 
Budgeting: How to Permanently Resolve State Budget Gaps, STATE BUDGET SOLUTIONS (2013), 
http://www.statebudgetsolutions.org/publications/detail/reality-based-budgeting-how-to-permanently-
resolve-state-budget-gaps, archived at http://perma.cc/5YQG-S8LB (describing the importance of budg-
etary techniques in the budgetary process). 
 76 See Tobin, supra note 75, at 155; Eucalitto, supra note 10 (describing the calendar games 
played by state officials taking advantage of the annual budgeting structure); Williams, supra note 75 
(explaining the importance of reality-based versus conventional budgeting). 
 77 See Williams, supra note 75. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Penn R. Pfiffner et al., Priority-Based Budgeting, FISCAL POLICY CTR. 27 (2010), http://tax.i2i.
org/files/2010/11/CB_PriorityBudgeting.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/EQ2E-LT8U. The amount of 
money needed to sustain current programs and expenses is called the “inputs.” Williams, supra note 
75. 
 80 Pfiffner et al., supra note 79, at 27. They consider the past allocation for that program, adjust for 
inflation, add caseload increases, and factor in new initiatives and policy changes. Williams, supra note 
75. 
 81 Pfiffner et al., supra note 79, at 27; Williams, supra note 75. 
 82 Williams, supra note 75; see also Pfiffner et al., supra note 79, at 27. This program is some-
times known as a “cost-plus” or “iceberg” model because only the baseline costs are considered and 
debated, whereas decades worth of spending and effectiveness remain hidden beneath the surface. 
Williams, supra note 75. 
 83 See Williams, supra note 75. 
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a consensus on how to effectively enforce balanced budget provisions.84 En-
forcement is an essential characteristic of any budgetary system and it exists out-
side the budgetary process framework.85 States have experimented with various 
enforcement mechanisms including having none at all, expanding executive 
power, debt issuance restrictions, and finally, looking to the courts for budgetary 
adjudication.86  
A third important characteristic of state budgetary procedures is that the 
budgetary system is annual, with yearly markers dictating budgetary deadlines.87 
State legislatures and governors use the budgetary procedure to allocate funds 
only for the next fiscal year, as the following year will have its own budgetary 
procedure.88 The state budgetary process is not designed to forecast needs be-
yond the immediate year.89 Additionally, each state periodically produces reports 
showing what revenues were received and how they were spent.90 
                                                                                                                           
 84 See GAO, supra note 40, at 20; NCSL Fiscal Brief, supra note 37, at 9; Koerner, supra note 37. 
State budgetary enforcement mechanisms and the criticisms surrounding them are explored in greater 
detail in Part II, Section A of this note. See infra notes 146–158 and accompanying text. 
 85 See Tobin, supra note 75, at 155. 
 86 See e.g., NEB. CONST. art. XIII, § 1 (restricting the issuance of debt); Judy v. Schaefer, 627 
A.2d 1039, 1054 (Md. 1993) (holding that the state’s balanced budget amendment had expanded the 
governor’s power to withhold public benefits in order to meet balanced budget demands); NCSL Fis-
cal Brief, supra note 37, at 9 (reporting that twenty-two states believe that the mere existence of the 
requirements are sufficient enforcement). 
 87 Hou & Smith, supra note 25, at 27. A fiscal year is different from a calendar year because it 
covers a twelve-month period that ends at last day of any month except December. Hunkar Ozyasar, 
What Is the Difference Between Fiscal Year & Calendar Year for a Business?, AZCENTRAL, http://
yourbusiness.azcentral.com/difference-between-fiscal-year-calendar-year-business-2883.html, ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/H2RA-BXQ2 (last visited Jan. 18, 2015). Most state fiscal calendars begin 
on July 1 and end on June 31. Quick Reference Fiscal Table, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGIS-
LATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/fiscal-policy/basic-information-about-which-states-have-
major-ta.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/7DJ8-UQ6X (last updated July 13, 2012). 
 88 ITA, The Truth About Balanced Budgets, supra note 12, at 9. Annual decisions about the gen-
eral operating budget are an important part of the budgetary process, as it requires the most year-to-
year changes. NCSL, Fiscal Brief, supra note 37, at 6. 
 89 See ITA, The Truth About Balanced Budgets, supra note 12, at 9. Proponents of annual budget-
ing claim that it allows for more accurate forecasting because economic information is likely to be 
more current and more precise, and provides leaders with more flexibility to adapt to changes in state 
economies. Ilene Grossman, Iowa, Michigan Consider Bucking Long-Time Trend That Has Seen 
States Move Away from Use of Biennial Fiscal Cycles in Favor of Annual Budgets, COUNCIL OF 
STATE GOV’TS MIDWEST, (Apr. 2011), http://www.csgmidwest.org/policyresearch/april2011budget
cycle.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/UFN6-R7RP. 
 90 ITA, The Truth About Balanced Budgets, supra note 12, at 9. A report showing how revenues 
were spent is known as a “Comprehensive Annual Financial Report,” or “CAFR.” Id. at 13. Though 
these reports are important means of conveying this critical financial information, many states have 
chronic difficulties producing them on time. Id. at 32. 
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C. Alternatives to Current Balanced Budget Structures 
In addition to these common features, there are a number of budget-
balancing tools that are less widespread.91 These alternatives are found in other 
contexts, including different countries, a small number of states, and in schol-
arly works.92 Subsection 1 explains cyclical-based budgetary structures.93 Sub-
section 2 examines reality-based budgeting and how it differs from traditional 
budgeting.94 Finally, Subsection 3 explores infrequently used alternative en-
forcement mechanisms.95  
1. Cyclical-Based Budgetary Structures 
Cyclical-based budgetary systems are systems that call for budgets to be 
balanced at the end of a given fiscal cycle, as opposed to on an annual basis.96 
The theory behind cyclical-based budgetary systems is that they are equipped to 
both promote long-term sustainability for the budget in question as well as more 
accurately represent the economic health of the budget.97 This is different from 
most state budgets that tend to need to be balanced annually.98 Rather than ad-
here to these annual checkpoints, cyclical-based budgeting strives to account for 
the inevitable booms and busts that states will experience over time.99 By loos-
                                                                                                                           
 91 See Hou & Smith, supra note 25, at 43–44 (detailing the common attributes of state balanced 
budget requirements); Tobin, supra note 75, at 170 (explaining that state courts have been unwilling 
to enforce balanced budget provisions); Eucalitto, supra note 10 (highlighting the lack of transparency 
in state balanced budget applications as a leading cause of budget problems). 
 92 See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. XI, § 213 (declaring an enforcement mechanism of holding authori-
ties personally responsible for a failure to balance budgets); BUNDESVERFASSUNG [BV] [CONSTITU-
TION] Dec. 2, 2001, SR 101, art. 126 (Switz.), translated in FED. CONST. OF THE SWISS CONFEDERA-
TION art. 12 (May 18, 2014) [hereinafter SWISS CONST.], http://www.admin.ch/ch/e/rs/1/101.en.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/6H9G-4PPW (applying a cyclical model for the Swiss balanced budget 
system). 
93 See infra notes 96–108 and accompanying text. 
94 See infra notes 109–125 and accompanying text. 
95 See infra notes 126–139 and accompanying text. 
 96 SWISS CONST. art. 126 (setting up a cyclical model for the Swiss budgetary system).  
 97 See Martin Larch & Alessandro Turrini, The Cyclically-adjusted Budget Balance in EU Fiscal 
Policy Making: A Love at First Sight Turned into a Mature Relationship, ECON. PAPERS 4–5, (Mar. 
2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication14644_en.pdf, ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/3C6T-97DF (arguing that cyclical based budgeting better accounts for tem-
porary economic fluctuations with a view towards long-term economic expansion); see also YILIN 
HOU, STATE GOVERNMENT BUDGET STABILIZATION: POLICY, TOOLS, AND IMPACTS 189 (2013) (ar-
guing that multiyear budgeting, such as cyclical budgeting, can, with appropriate structures, improve 
financial planning, ward off recessions, and be better set up for long-term financial stability). 
 98 Hou & Smith, supra note 25, at 34–35. Most states utilize this latter category, with the majority 
having requirements on a yearly basis. Id. 
 99 Gamage, supra note 11, at 766. This is starkly juxtaposed to a counter-cyclical system, where 
there are immediate reactions to the current economic climate. See generally Martin Feldstein, The 
Role for Discretionary Fiscal Policy in a Low Interest Rate Environment (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Re-
search, Working Paper No. 9203, 2002), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9203.pdf, archived 
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ening the time restrictions behind balancing requirements, budget-makers are 
theoretically in a better position to respond to these ebbs and flows because they 
can acquire debt during recessions, unafraid of violating balanced budget rules, 
and save extra revenue during booms.100 The hope behind this model is that it 
could successfully disentangle the permanent and temporary economic factors, 
and thus reveal the actual underlying budget position at the end of a given cy-
cle.101 
Switzerland’s debt-brake system illustrates a cyclical-based budgetary 
system in practice.102 The purpose of the debt brake is to stipulate a structurally 
balanced budget, which means that current expenditures have to be covered by 
current revenue without incurring any additional debt.103 It accomplishes this 
goal by placing a cap on annual government expenditures.104 Unlike most bal-
anced budget requirements, however, the Swiss debt-brake mechanism does not 
require the budget to be balanced annually.105 Instead, it is based on a multiyear 
period, calculated by the Swiss Federal Department of Finance.106 This allows 
                                                                                                                           
at http://perma.cc/8XUB-MPA3 (describing counter-cyclical policies and arguing for specific eco-
nomic situations where they can be constructive).  
 100 See Larch & Turrini, supra note 97, at 4–5. 
 101 Id. at 5. 
 102 See Alain Geier, The Debt Brake—The Swiss Fiscal Rule at the Federal Level 7 (Fed. Fin. 
Admin., Working Paper No. 15, 2011), available at http://www.efv.admin.ch/e/downloads/publik
ationen/arbeiten_oekonomenteam/workingpapers/Working_Paper_15_e.pdf, archived at http://perma.
cc/7ZRT-VSYX (summarizing how the cycle-based function of the Swiss debt brake acts in applica-
tion). 
 103 Debt Brake, THE GOVERNANCE REPORT 2013 (Oxford Univ. Press 2013), available at http://
www.governancereport.org/home/governance-innovations/featured-innovations-2013/debt-brake/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/LB9S-LG2R. The Swiss government had several stated objectives for the 
debt brake: simplicity, transparency, comprehensive scope of application, tracking the application, 
flexibility in case of extraordinary circumstances, and enforcement. Geier, supra note 102, at 12. 
 104 See SWISS CONST. art. 26; Geier, supra note 102, at 12. Swiss lawmakers use a simple and 
effective formula for calculating the cap on expenditures for a given cycle period. Geier supra note 102, 
at 13. The formula provides that in any calculation period, the maximum allowed expenditures must be 
equivalent to revenues multiplied by the “the business cycle adjustment factor.” Tobias Beljean & Alain 
Geier, The Swiss Debt Brake: Has It Been a Success? 3, 4 (Fed. Fin. Admin., Working Paper, Oct. 
2012), available at http://wwz.unibas.ch/fileadmin/wwz/redaktion/makrooekonomie/intermediate_
macro/current_issues/papers/4_swiss_issues/02_Impact_of_the_Swiss_debt_break_01.pdf, archived 
at http://perma.cc/XS5Z-LVS8 (displaying the formula, written mathematically, as G=R*(y/z), where 
G is the cap of expenditure, R is the revenue, y is the potential output, and z is the actual output, over 
a given period of time). A deficit is allowed whenever the business cycle adjustment factor is above one 
and a surplus is demanded if the business cycle adjustment factor is below one. Beljean & Geier, supra 
at 4 (summarizing the application of the formula). 
 105 See Daniel J. Mitchell, Switzerland’s “Debt Brake” Is a Role Model for Spending Control and 
Fiscal Restraint, FORBES, Apr. 26, 2012, http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielmitchell/2012/04/26/
switzerlands-debt-brake-is-a-role-model-for-spending-control-and-fiscal-restraint/, archived at http://
perma.cc/G7FP-ZH4P. 
 106 Id. For example, a recent cycle period used by the Swiss was three years. Federal Finance Ad-
ministration, The New Accounting Model of the Swiss Confederation, 2008 OECD J. ON BUDGETING 1, 
2015] Preventing State Balanced Budget Gimmicks 365 
the government to borrow more during a recession, but gives it an obligation to 
offset the deficit with surplus revenue during an economic upswing.107 The idea 
is to use the economic surpluses to cancel out the deficits within a given cycle to 
achieve budgetary balance.108 
2. Reality-Based Budgeting 
Reality-based budgeting, an alternative to the state’s common use of con-
ventional budgeting, is a way to allocate funds in crafting a budget.109 The goal 
is to create a “shopping list” from which the government must decide what ser-
vices and goals to “purchase” for the next budgetary term and which to 
“shelve.”110 Under this model, all new budgetary proposals are evaluated, not 
based on the level at which an agency has historically been funded, but rather on 
whether funding is going to work towards one of the state’s primary responsibili-
ties.111 The model evaluates allocation requests based on the priority of the activ-
ity, the efficiency with which it is performed, and the effectiveness it delivers.112 
As a result, only the most vital and efficient agencies receive funding.113 
Reality-based budgeting focuses on four main questions.114 First, the state 
must explain the funds available to it for allocating.115 Second, the budget-
makers must consider what services are absolutely necessary for citizens.116 The 
hope is that only core state-funded programs receive necessary funds and that 
                                                                                                                           
97, available at http://www.oecd.org/governance/budgeting/41823725.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
3XJK-SXMH. 
 107 Geier, supra note 102, at 14 (displaying the formulaic operation of the debt brake graphically). 
 108 Mitchell, supra note 105. 
 109 Williams, supra note 75. Reality-based budgeting is also sometimes referred to as “priority-
based budgeting.” Pfiffner et al., supra note 79, at 27. 
 110 Pfiffner et al., supra note 79, at 29 (arguing that this “buy list” mindset shifts the focus from 
which cuts to make and places it on the government actively spending the money). In essence, the 
government acts like any shopper, starting without any goods, choosing what it needs and putting 
away what it cannot afford and is not necessary. See id. 
 111 Taryn Purdy, Priority Based Budgeting/Washington State’s Priorities of Governance: A Re-
port Prepared for the Committee on Efficiency in State Government, MONT. LEGISLATIVE FISCAL 
DIV. 1 (2012); Williams, supra note 75. The underlying theory behind reality-based budgeting is that 
the state government, including all the various agencies and programs, is one unified enterprise. See 
Purdy, supra at 1. The states’ primary responsibilities are those functions that the government deems to 
be its highest priorities, generally including such issues as education, healthcare, security, economic vital-
ity, mobility, culture, environment, and governmental efficiency. See id. 
 112 Williams, supra note 75. A driving philosophy behind reality-based budgeting is that situa-
tions change and barriers need to move in order to maximize results for citizens. Id. 
 113 Id. (noting that agencies are no longer “fortified towers” that can siphon funds with little to no 
oversight). 
 114 Purdy, supra note 111, at 1. 
 115 Id. Ideally, this ensures that that expenditures cannot exceed the expected revenues for the com-
ing year. See Pfiffner et al., supra note 79, at 28. 
 116 Purdy, supra note 111, at 1. 
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money is not wasted on superfluous programs.117 Third, lawmakers must consid-
er the most effective methods to achieve their goals with the funds available.118 
Finally, the lawmakers must identify how to measure whether those core func-
tions are achieved.119 In this way, the government is meant to measure the effi-
cacy of programs and prioritize accordingly.120  
Although the vast majority of states utilize conventional budgeting, the 
State of Washington shows how reality-based budgeting can work in prac-
tice.121 First, Washington identified a list of core functions: education, 
healthcare, security, economic vitality, mobility, culture, environment, and gov-
ernmental efficiency.122 It then determined the results it wanted to achieve: stu-
dent achievement, improved healthcare, increased public safety, protected natu-
ral recourses, increased cultural opportunities for citizens, and economic devel-
opment.123 The state then published several metrics for measuring success and 
progress for those goals.124 Finally, the state developed a results-based prioritiza-
tion of activities that most directly accomplished the desired outcome and used 
that to inform the budget.125 
                                                                                                                           
 117 Pfiffner et al., supra note 79, at 28. Ideally, this model would protect essential services from 
budget cuts and protect controversial programs from political, election-based rhetoric. Id. at 28–29. 
The central issue is whether market forces and competition can deliver those goals effectively and 
efficiently without compromising cost and quality. Id. at 29. Although the determination of what con-
stitutes “essential public services” is expected to bring about debate amongst lawmakers and citizens, 
the determination nevertheless is a critical stage of reality-based budgeting. Williams, supra note 75. 
 118 Pfiffner et al., supra note 79, at 29. To make this process easier, agencies and programs must 
make mission statements to show the state what their goals and objectives are. Williams, supra note 
75. Ideally, the mission statements would be brief, precise descriptions of the agency’s purpose, ex-
plaining how it intends to accomplish its mission, and what outcomes will result from its success. Id. 
These mission statements then inform the priority metrics. Pfiffner et al., supra note 79, at 29. 
 119 Purdy, supra note 111, at 1. 
 120 Pfiffner et al., supra note 79, at 29. A reality-based budgeting system requires measurable 
indicators of success, including the delivery of desired services. Id. 
 121 Purdy, supra note 111, at 1. In 2002, Governor Gary Locke of Washington turned to this 
method with the hope of eliminating a $2.8 billion deficit without raising taxes. Pfiffner et al., supra 
note 79, at 30. After the deficit was erased, the technique was discontinued. Williams, supra note 75. 
 122 Purdy, supra note 111, at 3; Pfiffner et al., supra note 79, at 30. 
 123 Purdy, supra note 111, at 3. 
 124 Id. (noting that there were over 900 different metrics used across the various goals). For ex-
ample, some of the metrics used for public safety were incidents of crime per 1,000 people, highway 
fatalities per 100 million vehicle miles traveled, and recidivism rates for convicted criminals. Improve 
the Safety of People and Property, WASH. OFFICE OF FIN. MGMT., http://www.ofm.wa.gov/budget/
pog/safety.asp, archived at http://perma.cc/U788-52ZS (last visited Jan. 18, 2015). 
 125 Purdy, supra note 111, at 3. The process of individually naming, budgeting, and prioritizing 
agencies was performed at a multiagency level where appropriate. Id. This kind of budgeting has been 
hailed as a success where implemented. See, e.g., JOHN F. SHIREY, CITY MANAGER ANNUAL REPORT 
OF SUCCESSES AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS 2 (2012), available at http://portal.cityofsacramento.org/~/
media/Corporate/Files/CMO/CityManager/CMPerformance110912.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
F3KR-PDYB (describing the implementation of reality-based budgeting as one of the city’s successes 
of 2012); CTR. FOR PRIORITY BASED BUDGETING, http://www.pbbcenter.org/, archived at http://
perma.cc/4KLX-HSAZ (last visited Jan. 18, 2015) (listing the communities they helped implement the 
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3. Alternative Enforcement Mechanisms 
Although some states do have some form of an enforcement mechanism 
for their balanced budget requirements, they have generally shied away from 
granting authority to an independent source to ensure that such balanced budg-
et provisions are followed.126 The theory behind having an independent en-
forcement body is that, without proper policing, lawmakers will lack sufficient 
incentive to take the balanced budget requirements seriously and will gravitate 
towards violating them.127 Such independent enforcement helps maintain the 
integrity of the decision-making process and ensure that the decision makers are 
detached from the results of their decision.128  
The European Union’s Fiscal Compact provides an example.129 The en-
forcement measure relies on the Court of Justice of the European Union, which 
has been given binding authority on member states balanced budget issues.130 
The Compact only permits the European Commission, one of the governing 
branches of the European Union, to bring a grievance against a member state, 
but also allows any member state to challenge another for failing to meet the 
Compact’s requirements.131 If the Court of Justice of the European Union deter-
mines that a violation of the treaty has occurred, the violating member state must 
                                                                                                                           
budgeting technique and calling the implementation successful and repeatable); Priority Based Budg-
eting Update, DOUGLAS CNTY. NV (Mar. 11, 2013), http://www.douglascountynv.gov/Document
Center/View/1771, archived at http://perma.cc/VXV8-HWTV (listing success stories resulting from 
reality-based budgeting implementation in Douglas County, Nevada). 
 126 See generally Tobin, supra note 75 (outlining the various enforcement mechanisms utilized by 
the states). 
 127 James V. Saturno & Richard G. Forgette, The Balanced Budget Amendment: How Would It Be 
Enforced?, 18 PUB. BUDGETING & FIN. 1, 33, 48 (1998) (explaining that, without explicit and official 
enforcement mechanisms, enforcement would be left to public opinion, which can be problematic in 
effectively policing proper adherence to balanced budget provisions); see Tobin, supra note 75, at 155 
(arguing that the conflict between legislators’ desires to obey balanced budget provisions and their 
desire to keep programs funded and taxes low will lead to an unwillingness to adhere strictly to the 
spirit of the requirements and an abuse of gimmicks); see also Dieck v. Unified Sch. Dist. of Antigo, 
477 N.W.2d 613, 617–18 (Wis. 1991) (accusing the legislature of being all too willing and able to 
avoid balanced budget provisions). 
 128 See Saturno & Forgette, supra note 127, at 38 (illustrating that Congress’s prior attempt to 
enforce fiscal responsibility upon itself in the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act was ineffective due to 
political in-fighting and a lack of will to enforce the provisions). 
 129 See Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, 
pmbl., art. 16, Mar. 2, 2012 [hereinafter Fiscal Compact], available at http://www.eurozone.europa.
eu/euro-area/topics/treaty-on-stability,-coordination-and-governance-%28tscg%29/, archived at http://
perma.cc/8EDE-62S2. 
 130 Id., art. 8(1). The Court of Justice of the European Union can be properly invoked due to a 
provision in the founding treaty of the European Union, which grants jurisdiction to the court for spe-
cial treaties where both parties agree to submit the dispute to the authority of the court. Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union art. 273, Mar. 25, 1957, available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/
lexdocs/laws/en/eu/eu121en.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/L2BM-KZ97. 
 131 Fiscal Compact, supra note 129, art. 8. 
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take the necessary remedial actions.132 If the member fails to comply with the 
judgment, a second case can be brought before the court, which can then sanc-
tion the state with a “lump sum or penalty payment appropriate in the circum-
stances.”133 Moreover, some sources of European Union financial aid are contin-
gent upon compliance with the Compact.134 Although judicial enforcement is 
one method of providing teeth to balanced budget provisions, it is not the only 
method.135 
An alternative method of enforcement holds officials personally responsi-
ble for failing to balance the budget.136 Although extremely rare among states, a 
provision in the Alabama Constitution holds any lawmaker who violates the bal-
anced budget requirements personally liable.137 It also provides for strict sanc-
tions for that individual, up to $5,000 in fines and two years in prison.138 The 
provision, however, has been attacked for being merely an empty threat because, 
despite past failures of public officials to reach a balanced budget, it is unclear if 
the provision has ever been utilized in its entire history.139 
II. FALLING OUT OF BALANCE: PROBLEMS WITH STATES’ BALANCED  
BUDGET REQUIREMENTS 
Despite the prevalence of balanced budget requirements, states still face 
large budgetary shortfalls.140 There are a number of reasons why states have not 
                                                                                                                           
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. The penalty cannot exceed 0.1% of the gross national product. Id. 
 134 Id. pmbl.; Federico Fabbrini, The Fiscal Compact, the “Golden Rule,” and the Paradox of 
European Federalism, 36 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 8 (2013). Although still young, the Fiscal 
Compact has thus far been successful in promoting member states, such as Italy and Spain, in passing 
balanced budget provisions. See Art. X, Costituzione [Cost.] (It.); C.E., B.O.E. n. 311, sec. 135, Dec. 
29, 1978 (Spain) (revised Sept. 27, 2011). See generally Fabbrini, supra (discussing Spain and Italy as 
examples of EU member states adapting their constitutions to meet the Fiscal Compact’s mandate). 
Despite its successes, the Fiscal Compact has received criticism from those that think it infringes on 
state sovereignty, imposes the will of larger states upon the smaller, and fosters mistrust among differ-
ent peoples of Europe. Anna Kocharov, The Fiscal Compact Treaty Disempowers National Parlia-
ments and Undermines Trust Between the Peoples of Europe, LONDON SCH. OF ECON. & POL. SCI. 
(May 7, 2012), http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/05/07/fiscal-compact-disempowers/, archived 
at http://perma.cc/K6W6-7SLY.  
 135 Compare Fiscal Compact, supra note 129, art. 8 (providing independent judicial oversight), 
with ALA. CONST. art. XI § 213 (imposing personal liability on officials who fail to meet balanced 
budget standards as a possible enforcement tool). 
 136 ALA. CONST. art. XI, § 213 (declaring that any state official found in violation of balanced 
budget requirements can be subject to fines up to $5,000 and up to two years in prison). 
 137 See id. 
 138 See id. 
 139 See NCSL Fiscal Brief, supra note 37, at 9. 
 140 See Karen Yourish & Laura Stanton, States in Crisis, WASH. POST, Feb. 2011, http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/state-budget-crisis/, archived at http://perma.cc/
D7NZ-GJWN (displaying the current state budgetary situations). 
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lived up to the lofty ideals of a balanced budget.141 This Part studies the prob-
lems inherent with balanced budget requirements.142 Section A considers the 
problems with the enforcement mechanisms states employ.143 Section B then 
outlines the “creative accounting” and budgetary gimmicks state actors use to 
evade both the letter and spirit of the balanced budget requirements.144 Finally, 
Section C addresses structural problems with balanced budget requirements that 
cause harm to state economies.145 
A. Limitations with Current Budgetary Enforcement Mechanisms 
States have different philosophies on how to enforce balanced budget re-
quirements.146 Most states have decided against using legal mechanisms to en-
force compliance.147 According to these states, the mere presence of a constitu-
tional or statutory demand for a balanced budget is a sufficient guarantee be-
cause it creates political expectations on the government.148 Moreover, some 
lawmakers argue that a tradition of balancing budgets is sufficient to generate 
political pressure to do so.149 Critics of this practice point out that state officials 
frequently attempt to thwart the purpose behind the balanced budget require-
ments, such as shifting money from different funds to create the appearance of a 
                                                                                                                           
 141 See ITA, The Truth About Balanced Budgets, supra note 12, at 25 (detailing the prevalence of 
balanced budget provisions among the states in either constitutional or statutory form). 
 142 See infra notes 146–194 and accompanying text. 
 143 See infra notes 146–158 and accompanying text. 
 144 See infra notes 159–176 and accompanying text. 
 145 See infra notes 177–194 and accompanying text. 
 146 Koerner, supra note 37; see GAO, supra note 40, at 11–13; NCSL Fiscal Brief, supra note 37, 
at 9. 
 147 See VA. CODE ANN. § 30-250 (2011 & Supp. 2014) (demanding a budget that balances total 
expenditures with total revenues, without a binding enforcement mechanism); GAO, supra note 40, at 
21 (juxtaposing proposed legislation for a federal balanced budget amendment relying on extensive 
formula-based enforcement provisions with most state balanced budget requirements, which do not 
rely on formal legal sanctions); NCSL Fiscal Brief, supra note 37, at 9 (highlighting that twenty-seven 
states did not report having an enforcement mechanism tied to their balanced budget provisions). 
Many of the twenty-two states that reported having an enforcement mechanism consider the existence 
of the constitutional amendment itself as an enforcement device. NCSL Fiscal Brief, supra note 37, at 
9. 
 148 See Eucalitto, supra note 10 (explaining that state officials defend this strategy by arguing that 
the expectation of a balanced budget is enough incentive to replace actual sanctions); Koerner, supra 
note 37 (arguing that state legislatures fear backlash from fiscal conservatives if they fail to balance 
the budget, despite the fact that such backlash is rare and has been generally unsuccessful in most 
cases). But see ALA. CONST. art. XI, § 213 (declaring that any state official found in violation of bal-
anced budget requirements can be subject to fines up to $5,000 and up to two years in prison). 
 149 Gamage, supra note 11, at 764 (arguing that norms can be an effective constraint against states 
running deficits); Todd Haggerty, Balanced Budget Requirements, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES (Apr. 25, 2012), http://ncsl.typepad.com/the_thicket/2012/04/who-was-a-little-budget-
trivia.html, archived at http://perma.cc/GM9G-DBAU (explaining that a tradition of balanced budgets 
can act as a stronger political rule than sanctions). 
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balanced budget without ever matching revenues and expenditures.150 Without 
actual sanctions behind those rules, political operators have even less incentive 
to obey them.151 
Another common method of implementing balanced budget requirements is 
through the executive branch’s authority over budgetary matters.152 Some state 
governors have impounded or withheld funds that they would otherwise be obli-
gated to spend in an effort to satisfy balanced budget requirements.153 This 
growth in executive power either develops organically or has been written into 
the requirements themselves.154 Other executive powers given by states include 
the power to reduce the enacted budget, spend unanticipated funds, and restrict 
the budget reductions without legislative approval.155 Critics accuse this system 
of upsetting the separation of power, and granting the executive broad, undefined 
powers without standards to guide its discretion.156 
                                                                                                                           
 150 See infra notes 159–176 and accompanying text (detailing a number of gimmicks and other 
practices employed by lawmakers to circumvent balanced budget requirements); see also Eucalitto, 
supra note 10 (listing a number of examples of lawmakers undercutting balanced budget require-
ments); Joe Luppino-Esposito, The Worst State Budget Gimmicks of 2013, STATE BUDGET SOLU-
TIONS (Jan. 3, 2014), http://www.statebudgetsolutions.org/publications/detail/the-worst-state-budget-
gimmicks-of-2013, archived at http://perma.cc/5QGN-A3RZ (providing instances of public officials 
violating the spirit of balanced budget requirements). 
 151 See Gamage, supra note 11, at 763 (explaining that during the 2001–2003 economic down-
turn, the lack of proper enforcement measures caused an increase in the number of state lawmakers 
using budget gimmicks to survive the initial wave of financial problems). 
 152 See GAO, supra note 40, at 22 (explaining the control over budgetary cuts that many state 
governors enjoy); see also Budget Processes in the States, NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS 
12 (July 1992) [hereinafter 1992 NASBO Report], http://www.nasbo.org/sites/default/files/BP_1992.
pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/Z57R-UX43 (illustrating the different types of gubernatorial respon-
sibilities). 
 153 Judy v. Schaefer, 627 A.2d 1039, 1054 (Md. 1993) (holding that the balanced budget amend-
ment had expanded the governor’s power to withhold public benefits to meet balanced budget de-
mands); Tobin, supra note 75, at 166 (discussing the governor’s use of line item vetoes and withhold-
ing funds to meet balanced budget requirements). In upholding the governor’s power to withhold 
funds for balanced budget purposes, the Court of Appeals in Maryland discussed how the increasing 
presence of balanced budget requirements has led to a greater liberality for the executive branch to 
respond to economic and financial issues. Judy, 627 A.2d at 1051. Additionally, there have been in-
stances of executive branch members refusing to issue debt, even when the debt has been expressly au-
thorized by the legislator. People ex rel. Ogilvie v. Lewis, 274 N.E.2d 87, 96 (Ill. 1971) (forcing the 
Secretary of State to release transportation bonds). 
 154 Compare N.C. CONST. art. III § 5 (requiring the governor to “effect the necessary economies 
in State expenditures” whenever he or she determines that there is a budget shortfall), with Judy, 627 
A.2d at 1050–51 (holding that the governor’s ability to withhold funds was implied by the balanced 
budget requirements and the increasing complexity of economic and financial demands of govern-
ment). 
 155 1992 NASBO Report, supra note 152, at 12 (detailing which executive enforcement options 
each state utilizes in its balanced budget processes). 
 156 See Ogilvie, 274 N.E.2d at 96 (curtailing executive branch’s control over the issuing of bonds 
in the presence of legislative demand); Judy, 627 A.2d at 1051 (reiterating plaintiff’s arguments that 
allowing the governor so much power violated separation of powers and failed to provide sufficient 
standards). 
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Although there have also been attempts to utilize the courts as an enforce-
ment mechanism, judges thus far have been reluctant to intervene.157 State 
courts have dismissed balanced budget complaints for various reasons, including 
mootness, a lack of standing, and nonjusticiability due to the political question 
doctrine.158 
B. Avoiding the Rules: Circumventing Budgetary Requirements 
Another way that state balanced budget requirements run into trouble is 
the increased use of budgetary gimmicks that state officials use to circumvent 
the requirements.159 For example, state officials often redefine or manipulate 
interpretations of the wordings of the requirement in a way that defies the origi-
nal intent of the requirement.160 States have done this by interpreting the original 
wording of the balance budget requirements to claim that expenditures should 
not exceed revenues, but failing to specify what revenues include.161 This inter-
pretation leaves state officials with a myriad of options about the types of cash 
inflows that can be included.162 
                                                                                                                           
 157 See, e.g., Bishop v. Governor, 380 A.2d 220, 223 (Md. 1977) (holding that a complaint that 
the budget plan was unconstitutional was moot and also suggesting that they could step in if there was 
an emergency situation); Bd. of Educ. of the Twp. of Fairfield v. Kean, 457 A.2d 59, 64 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. Ch. Div. 1982) (asserting that courts should stay out of budgetary disputes); Tobin, supra note 75, 
at 170–71 (discussing the history of state courts’ decisions in cases regarding enforcement of balanced 
budget requirements). 
 158 See, e.g., Bishop, 380 A.2d at 223 (holding a budgetary complaint moot); Bd. of Educ. of the 
Twp. of Fairfield, 457 A.2d at 64 (refusing to allow courts to enter budgetary questions). Mootness is 
the court’s refusal to hear a case because it is no longer a live controversy. See Walling v. James V. 
Reuter, Inc. 321 U.S. 671, 677 (1944). Standing is the ability of a party to bring a claim before a court 
by establishing that he or she suffered injury in fact, causation of that injury, and the court’s ability to 
remedy the injury. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). The political ques-
tion doctrine renders a case nonjusticiable because it would be inappropriate for the judicial branch to 
decide an issue that fell under the auspices of a coequal branch of government. See Baker v. Carr, 369 
U.S. 186, 210 (1962). 
 159 See infra notes 160–176 and accompanying text (outlining the many different methods state 
officials have used to undermine the balanced budget requirements). 
 160 See ITA, The Truth About Balanced Budgets, supra note 12, at 27 (detailing the “word games” 
played by states to avoid or undermine the spirit of balanced budget requirements). For example, leg-
islators have relied on convenient definitions of critical words of statutory or constitutional language, 
used accruals only when beneficial, and claimed to have a balanced budget because the operating fund 
was balanced even though a massive structural deficit existed. Id. at 17.  
 161 See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art VIII, § 2 (requiring that expenditures should not exceed “funds esti-
mated . . . to be available”); NEB. CONST. art. XIII, § 1 (requiring that expenditures should not exceed 
revenues or other means of financing); N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (requiring that the budget include 
“moneys and revenues” sufficient to meet proposed expenditures). 
 162 See ITA, The Truth About Balanced Budgets, supra note 12, at 27. For example, when the 
requirement calls for state revenue to be balanced, budget-makers can choose what money counts as 
revenue and what does not. Id. The classic example, discussed below, is including debt as revenue to 
boost the number and portray a financial strength that is not actually present. Id.  
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Critics accuse state officials of taking advantage of this in several ways, in-
cluding characterizing debt as revenue and fund sweeping.163 Some states claim 
to have achieved a balanced budget while still running a structural deficit.164 
Although this technically complies with the balanced budget requirements, the 
state remains in fiscal danger.165 Some of these “word games” have been so ob-
vious or egregious that courts have intervened, if only to interpret the statutory 
or constitutional language.166 
States also manipulate the calendar to gain the appearance of a more bal-
anced budget.167 Similar to how they would shift money from one fund to anoth-
er, states will often shift money from one fiscal year to the next to achieve the 
                                                                                                                           
 163 See ITA, The Truth About Balanced Budgets, supra note 12 at 27–28 (highlighting particular 
instances of states utilizing these methods). Characterizing debt as revenue means including money 
that the state has acquired through loans and considering it equivalent with all other state revenues. 
See id. A particularly egregious example of the categorization of debt as revenue occurred in Illinois 
in 2009 when the state borrowed over two billion dollars to finance the current service of state em-
ployees. Id. at 27. Although such action was contrary to the principles of accountability and a bal-
anced budget, both the governor and legislature found that the action worked under the current phras-
ing of the balanced budget law, which called for expenditures to meet “funds available.” Id.; see ILL. 
CONST. art VIII, § 2. Another example occurred in California in 2011, when the governor used $11 
billion of loaned money from bonds to lower the deficit from $20.6 billion to $9.6 billion. Wayne 
Lusvardi, Calif. Gov. Jerry Brown Debt Gimmicks ‘Balance’ Budget, WATCHDOG.ORG (June 14, 
2011), http://watchdog.org/9892/calif-gov-jerry-brown-debt-gimmicks-%E2%80%98balance%E2%
80%99-budget/, archived at http://perma.cc/8P99-SN6L. Fund sweeping occurs when money from 
one fund is transferred to another to create the illusion that the latter fund is balanced. See ITA, The 
Truth About Balanced Budgets, supra note 12, at 27–28 (comparing fund sweeping to an individual 
switching money from his or her savings account to his or her checking account and declaring that 
they made money). Illinois engaged in fund sweeping in 2009 when the governor proposed to move 
$350 million from the state trust fund, which does not need to be balanced, to the state general fund, 
which does need to be balanced. Id. 
 164 ITA, The Truth About Balanced Budgets, supra note 12, at 27–28. A structural deficit is de-
fined as, “a condition in which the revenues produced by a state’s tax system . . . are insufficient to 
maintain existing levels of services.” Hal Hovey, The Dangers of Structural Deficits for the Future of 
Public Education, NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N RESEARCH, 4 (1998), quoted in ITA, The Truth About Bal-
anced Budgets, supra note 12, at 28. 
 165 ITA, The Truth About Balanced Budgets, supra note 12, at 27–28. In the short term, this 
means that current bills for ongoing services remain unpaid and in the long term that state employees’ 
post-employment commitments are not recognized or are paid from money diverted from other funds. 
Id. at 28 (explaining the dangers of structural deficits). 
 166 See, e.g., Hovey v. Foster, 21 N.E. 39 (Ind. 1889) (approving a temporary loan to pay unex-
pected budgetary deficiencies); Louisiana Fed’n of Teachers v. State, 118 So.3d 1033, 1042 (La. 
2013) (invalidating fund-shifting between education budgets as violating the state constitution); Wein 
v. State, 347 N.E.2d 586, 587 (N.Y. 1976) (deciding that borrowing cannot be considered either a gift 
or a loan, but must be made in anticipation of future revenue of taxes); see also ITA, The Truth About 
Balanced Budgets, supra note 12, at 27 (categorizing this kind of behavior as “word games”).  
 167 See Eucalitto, supra note 10 (outlining various examples of state officials manipulating the 
calendar to undermine balanced budget requirements). States strategically delay payments, such as 
employee paychecks or paying back debts, and push them into the next fiscal year so that they do not 
count for the current year’s balanced budget requirements. Id. 
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illusion of a balanced budget.168 Fiscal shifting involves delaying payments until 
the next fiscal year, which moves the financial debt burden to the next year and 
thus avoids running afoul of balanced budget amendments as well as political 
backlash.169 
States also manipulate expenses by simply not paying their bills.170 Many 
states allow government officials to delay the payment of vendor bills and to 
defer compensation costs, such as pension and other retirement benefits.171 Crit-
ics argue that not only does this maneuver deny money to those who need or 
have earned it, but it also creates huge budget holes for the state that could take 
years to redress.172 
Finally, critics accuse states of unrealistically inflating projections and rev-
enue assumptions to justify increased expenditures.173 To demonstrate a bal-
anced budget and justify increased expenditures, state officials will often inflate 
revenue projections by creating unrealistic pictures of revenue growth or misrep-
resenting rates of inflation.174 Similarly, states often fail to report the true cost of 
                                                                                                                           
 168 Id. This is a more common tactic amongst states with strict rules about carrying deficits over 
to the next year, especially when faced with low net revenues, because there is greater need to acquire 
immediate cash to meet the more stringent requirements. See Anna Costello et al., The Hidden Conse-
quences of Balanced Budget Requirements 30 (Sept. 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://www.insead.edu/facultyresearch/areas/accounting/events/documents/TheHiddenConsequences
ofBalancedBudgetRequirements.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/LX4R-8AEA. 
 169 See Eucalitto, supra note 10. Minnesota acted similarly when it delayed payments to school 
districts, which resulted in schools not having the necessary funds for a long period of time, with some 
receiving as low as only sixty percent of the required funds. After Delays Caused by State Budget 
Shortages, Minn. Schools Seeing Aid Catch-Up Payments, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB. (Oct. 17, 2013), 
available at http://www.statebudgetsolutions.org/publications/detail/after-delays-caused-by-state-
budget-shortages-minn-schools-seeing-aid-catch-up-payments, archived at http://perma.cc/Q7QP-
3LYU. 
 170 ITA, The Truth About Balanced Budgets, supra note 12, at 31. Some states’ payment delays 
for budgetary purposes have become routine. Id. For example, Illinois had delayed payments to such 
an extent that the state comptroller announced in 2008 that there was an unprecedented billions of 
dollars worth of backlog of deferred payments. The Section 25 Budget “Loophole,” FISCAL FOCUS 7 
(July 2008), available at http://www.ioc.state.il.us/index.cfm/resources/fiscal-focus/july-2008-
medicaid/, archived at http://perma.cc/BF2P-J6XB.  
 171 ITA, The Truth About Balanced Budgets, supra note 12, at 31. This occurs often in Illinois, 
when it fails to make Medicaid payments to health care providers in order to make the budget appear 
balanced, despite Medicaid receiving insufficient funding. State Medicaid Programs Face Funding 
Challenges, FISCAL FOCUS 1, 3–6 (July 2008), available at http://www.ioc.state.il.us/index.cfm/
resources/fiscal-focus/july-2008-medicaid/, archived at http://perma.cc/BF2P-J6XB. 
 172 See ITA, The Truth About Balanced Budgets, supra note 12, at 31. In 2007, California taxpay-
ers had to pay $700 million, including interest, for the legal action following California lawmakers’ 
attempt to decrease the budgetary shortfall by withholding teachers’ retirement payments. Teacher’s 
Ret. Bd. v. Genest, 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d 326, 350–51 (Ct. App. 2007). 
 173 See Luppino-Esposito, supra note 150 (highlighting several recent incidents of inflated projec-
tions or unfounded assumptions). 
 174 Id. This occurred in Minnesota in 2013 when Governor Mark Dayton was forced to reevaluate 
his budget predictions after he had inflated revenue predictions by $58 million. Minn. G.O.P. Ques-
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retirement obligations.175 The budgets only include the pension contributions 
legislatures decide they want to pay going forward, but ignore retirement bene-
fits that have been earned by the workers during the current budget period.176 
C. Balancing the Wrong Things: Incentivizing the Wrong Behavior 
Another common criticism against state balanced budget requirements is 
that they incentivize the state to behave in ways that can actually cause more 
harm to the economy.177 Recently, states have been accused of misusing funds 
that were designated for a particular purpose.178 
For example, Arizona took money from the National Mortgage Settlement, 
designed to help homeowners who lost equity during the market collapse, and 
instead transferred it to the state general fund.179 Another example comes from 
the 1998 Tobacco Settlement Master Agreement, in which tobacco companies 
promised to pay over $200 billion to the states over twenty years to cover tobac-
co-related healthcare costs.180 Rather than putting these funds to their intended 
use, many states, like New Hampshire, applied the proceeds to unrelated funds, 
including the general fund.181 
                                                                                                                           
tions ‘Cuts’ in Dayton Budget, YAHOO! NEWS (Jan. 28, 2013, 4:19 PM), http://news.yahoo.com/minn-
gop-questions-cuts-dayton-211948650.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ZHA4-C3DA. 
 175 ITA, The Truth About Balanced Budgets, supra note 12, at 30. Indeed, retirement and pension 
projections can fluctuate wildly and states already have a difficult time structuring and predicting pension 
plans without the element of budgetary gimmickry. Cf. David C. John, States Created Their Public Pen-
sion Problems, and States Should Solve Them, HERITAGE FOUND. (Jan. 17, 2012), http://www.
heritage.org/research/reports/2012/01/state-and-local-government-problems-with-public-pension-plans, 
archived at http://perma.cc/R65D-VA6S (listing issues with the structure of the pension programs and 
the difficulties states face with predicting and budgeting for pensions).  
 176 ITA, The Truth About Balanced Budgets, supra note 12, at 30. For example, in 2007, Califor-
nia taxpayers had to pay $700 million to make up for lawmakers’ failure to pay teachers’ retirement 
benefits. Teachers Ret. Bd., 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 350–51. 
 177 See infra notes 178–194 and accompanying text. 
 178 Luppino-Esposito, supra note 150 (outlining some of the most egregious recent examples of 
misuse of funds). 
 179 Arizona OK to Use Mortgage Settlement Funds for General Purposes, PHX. BUS. J. (Sept. 25, 
2013), http://www.bizjournals.com/phoenix/morning_call/2013/09/arizona-ok-to-use-mortgage-
settlement.html, archived at http://perma.cc/7SQQ-3ZQD. Six other states (Missouri, California, 
South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, and New Jersey) have also ignored the intended use for similar 
funds and have not directed any of it toward housing-related activities. Luppino-Esposito, supra note 
150. Additionally, fourteen other states, including Idaho and Illinois, are using less than half of the 
funds for their intended purpose. Id. 
 180 Eucalitto, supra note 10. State credit ratings are an additional mechanism to judge a state’s 
financial health, as their financial problems are often reflected in their credit ratings. See John 
Klingner, Illinois Has the Lowest Credit Rating of All 50 States, ILLINOISPOLICY.ORG, (Nov. 19, 
2013), http://www.illinoispolicy.org/illinois-has-lowest-credit-rating-of-all-50-states/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/LQ78-MZ5Q (describing how Illinois’s low credit rating is linked to the state’s con-
tinuing struggle with pension plans). 
181 Grant Bosse, New Hampshire Relies on Tobacco Money to Balance, N.H. WATCHDOG.ORG, 
(Apr. 3, 2013), http://newhampshire.watchdog.org/11853/nh-house-budget-relies-on-tobacco-money-
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States also borrow more money to meet balanced budget demands.182 Be-
cause many of the balanced budget requirements define revenue to include debt, 
many states liberally incur debt to meet balanced budget requirements.183 Such 
action is heavily criticized because it worsens the state’s long-term financial 
health.184 This stopgap measure also creates uncertainty because the state must 
rely on a lenders’ determination of the interest rate the state must pay bondhold-
ers.185 
States also have turned to one-time sales of state-owned assets to bridge 
budgetary gaps, which damages the states in the long term.186 Critics denounce 
such tactics because states tend to have to sell such assets at a substantial dis-
count.187 Additionally, the sale of government assets represents a one-time cash 
infusion.188 Although it may provide temporary relief, without further action, the 
problems will simply reoccur in the next fiscal years.189 Furthermore, in requir-
                                                                                                                           
to-balance/, archived at http://perma.cc/ZPE7-QD9N. New Mexico and New York have also reported 
that the Tobacco Settlement money has not been dedicated for the stated purposes, but has been allo-
cated to other funds, including heavily into the general operating budget. See Eucalitto, supra note 10. 
In addition to misusing funds, states have also inadequately funded necessary government programs, 
such as education and Medicaid, to make up the budgetary gap. Kristen De Pena, Budget Gimmicks 
February 2013, STATE BUDGET SOLUTIONS (Feb. 5, 2013), http://www.statebudgetsolutions.org/
publications/detail/budget-gimmicks-february-2013, archived at http://perma.cc/2UQU-
XRLU. For example, Hawaii diverted all of its funds intended for private hospitals to help 
offset the cost of treating Medicaid patients. Id. 
 182 See Luppino-Esposito, supra note 150 (providing recent examples of states incurring debt to 
reach balanced budget status). 
 183 See Eucalitto, supra note 10 (describing the word manipulation gimmicks of states, including 
states’ inclusion of debt to count against expenditures in balanced budget calculations). For example, 
in 2013, Governor Dannel Malloy of Connecticut borrowed $10 million to pay off state obligations, but 
characterized the money as “savings” for budgetary purposes. De Pena, supra note 181. Typically, a 
state borrows money through the issuance of bonds. Luppino-Esposito, supra note 150.  
184 See Eucalitto, supra note 10 (“Without limits on the ability to issue debt to ‘balance’ annual 
budgets, states are free to impose harsh obligations on future generations.”). 
 185 RICHARD BRIFFAULT, BALANCING ACTS: THE REALITY BEHIND STATE BALANCED BUDGET 
REQUIREMENTS 5 (1996) (arguing that lenders have heavy control over state budget decisions because 
of their control over interest rates); see Eucalitto, supra note 10 (explaining that states taking on too 
much debt imposes harsh obligations upon future generations). 
 186 See Costello et al., supra note 168, at 7 (concluding that when states are in serious financial 
trouble, they are far more likely to sell off assets). For example, Detroit is considering selling its art 
collection for an estimated $500 million, which is millions below the actual value of the art, in addi-
tion to being an incalculable cultural loss to the city. Randy Kennedy, Detroit Art Museum Offers 
Plan to Avoid Sale of Art, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2014, at A18. 
 187 See Costello et al., supra note 168, at 7 (discussing results depicting that a $100 per capita 
deficit shock in a state with a strict balanced budget requirement results in a 30% reduction in the ratio 
of the proceeds from asset sales to the book value of the assets sold). This is because private sector 
property buyers take advantage of the state’s desperation for funds and inexperience in negotiating 
these types of transactions. See ITA, The Truth About Balanced Budgets, supra note 12, at 29; see 
also Eucalitto, supra note 10. 
 188 Costello et al., supra note 168, at 2. 
 189 De Pena, supra note 181 (noting that selling assets to cover the budgetary gap effectively 
creates larger future deficits because expenditures including the sale do not decrease in the following 
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ing immediate cash flows from the sale of assets, the state can lose substantial 
future revenue from that asset, which could cost taxpayers dearly.190 
Finally, critics claim that flaws in state balanced budget requirements frus-
trate states’ ability to adequately fund special funds reserved for periods of eco-
nomic recession, sometimes referred to as “rainy-day funds.”191 Although many 
states invest in rainy-day funds, most are inadequately funded.192 By focusing 
balanced budget requirements around short-term deadlines, politicians are incen-
tivized to focus only on the short-term economic picture.193 Instead of building 
rainy-day funds for future needs, politicians generally deplete the funds to cut 
taxes or increase spending and advance short-term political agendas.194 
III. BALANCING THE EQUATION: SOLUTIONS TO HELP STATE  
BALANCED BUDGET REQUIREMENTS 
With serious problems continuing to undermine states’ efforts to effectively 
utilize and meet their balanced budget requirements, states are searching for 
solutions to obtain better results.195 By adopting reality-based budgeting, stricter 
                                                                                                                           
fiscal years despite the absence of the sale of the assets); see Costello et al., supra note 168, at 10 
(discussing the trade-off between needing cash now and the future cash flows from the assets). The 
lack of political accountability in these decisions is also particularly troubling because the elected 
officials making these immediate selling decisions are unlikely to be in office when the foregone fu-
ture cash flows are most needed. Costello et al., supra note 168, at 10. 
 190 Eucalitto, supra note 10; Costello et al., supra note 168, at 13. For example, a 2009 Arizona 
sale and lease-back that was sold for $735 million is estimated to cost the state over $1.5 billion in 
lease-back fees over the next two decades. Jennifer Steinhauer, In Need of Cash, Arizona Puts Offices 
on Sale, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2009, at A16. 
 191 See Gamage, supra note 11, at 766 (explaining states’ problems with effectively creating and 
using rainy-day funds). 
 192 Id.; see NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, BUDGETING AMID FISCAL UNCERTAIN-
TY: ENSURING BUDGET STABILITY BY FOCUSING ON THE LONG TERM 14–15 (2004), available at 
http://www.nasbo.org/sites/default/files/pdf/budgetstabilityFeb2004.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
5J9C-L7UD (describing how states create and use rainy-day funds). For example, the rainy-day funds 
created during the economic boom of the 1990s covered less than one-sixth of the revenue shortfalls 
during the subsequent downturn. Gamage, supra note 11, at 766; Robert Zahradnik, Rainy Day Funds: 
Opportunities for Reform, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES 1 (Mar. 9, 2005), available at http://
www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=168, archived at http://perma.cc/HLW8-8UL5 (indicating 
that states only had $30 billion in reserve funds, while facing an over $250 billion deficit in 2001). 
 193 Gamage, supra note 11, at 766. 
 194 Id. (explaining that politicians see rainy-day funds as a gift to their unknown successors and 
prefer to use it for their own ends rather than give it away to a future generation). But see Elizabeth 
McNichol, When and How States Should Strengthen Their Rainy Day Funds, CTR. ON BUDGET & 
POL’Y PRIORITIES (Apr. 16, 2014), http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=4129, archived at http://
perma.cc/9RX6-R26H (stating that, since 2010, many states have begun to slowly restore their rainy-
day funds).  
 195 See Gamage, supra note 11 (describing the recent history of states’ failures to maintain a bal-
anced budget); see also Katherine Barrett & Richard Greene, Do States Really Balance Their Budg-
ets?, GOVERNING.COM (Oct. 2011), http://www.governing.com/columns/smart-mgmt/do-states-really-
balance-their-budgets.html, archived at http://perma.cc/L5C5-KNTP (arguing that because of gim-
micks and loopholes, balanced budgets are an unobtainable goal for most states). 
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enforcement mechanisms, and cycle-based timelines, states can solve many of 
the problems that currently afflict their balanced budget system.196 Section A 
argues that reality-based budgeting can produce sounder financial situations for 
states, while also eliminating the desirability of many budgetary gimmicks and 
abuses.197 Section B describes how a cyclical-based budgetary timeline can 
strengthen states’ budgetary procedures, including eliminating gimmicks and 
encouraging long-term sustainability.198 Finally, Section C concludes that stricter 
enforcement mechanisms would lead to more effective application of balanced 
budget provisions.199 To that end, Section C provides two possibilities for en-
forcement: having an independent state agency as a budgetary watchdog and 
imposing personal liability for state officials committing egregious miscon-
duct.200 
A. Reality Check: States Should Adopt Reality-Based Budgeting 
Conventional budgeting techniques are a major source of the problems for 
state budgetary systems.201 By focusing on agencies’ baseline budgets and inten-
tions, rather than on their efficacy, states waste money on unsuccessful initia-
tives.202 Conventional budgeting also fails to encourage agencies to increase 
goal-oriented productivity.203 Moreover, the current system traps legislatures into 
giving money to agencies based on precedent, rather than inspiring agencies to 
achieve key policy goals.204 By giving money without looking into an agency’s 
operations, legislatures allocate funds to outmoded sources or agencies with 
                                                                                                                           
 196 See infra notes 201–284 and accompanying text. 
 197 See infra notes 201–231 and accompanying text. 
 198 See infra notes 232–255 and accompanying text. 
 199 See infra notes 256–284 and accompanying text. 
 200 See infra notes 256–284 and accompanying text. 
 201 See Williams, supra note 75 (describing the importance of budgetary techniques in the budget-
ary process). 
 202 Id. For example, the state of Illinois recently came under fire for unnecessary spending, including 
$5 million for a state fair, $3.34 million for a shooting complex, $2.37 million for a new 3-D cinema, and 
over $20 thousand for a pig racing event. Benjamin Van Metre, Illinois State Government Wastes Hun-
dreds of Millions of Taxpayer Dollars, ILLINOISPOLICY.ORG (Sept. 17, 2013), http://www.illinois
policy.org/illinois-state-government-wastes-hundreds-of-millions-of-taxpayer-dollars/, archived at http://
perma.cc/TVK8-45K2.  
 203 See Williams, supra note 75. By guaranteeing a baseline of money, conventional budgeting 
fails to promote initiative and motivate agencies to distinguish themselves with inventiveness and 
improvement. See id. 
 204 See Pfiffner et al., supra note 79, at 27 (stating that agencies are placed on equal footing, re-
gardless of their size or effectiveness, simply because it was funded the previous year); see also Out-
comes-Based Budget Overview, NEWTONMA.GOV, http://www.newtonma.gov/civicax/filebank/
documents/51346, archived at http://perma.cc/QDE2-3A6N (last visited Jan. 19, 2015) (explaining 
that counter-productivity results from not deciding a budget based on the goals to be accomplished).  
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flawed designs.205 When states fail to maximize the use of their money with se-
rious considerations of effectiveness and efficiency, conventional spending pro-
duces a tendency to overspend.206 
Reality-based budgeting is an improved method over conventional budget-
ing because it encourages careful spending by scrutinizing whether funds are 
going to the most effective sources possible.207 By taking an objective look at 
each agency, legislatures are given more clear-cut choices and made acutely 
aware of how their decisions impact taxes and spending.208 Additionally, the out-
comes are improved, as wasteful agencies are eliminated and only the most effi-
cient and effective agencies receive funds.209 By using tangible metrics in as-
sessing the performance of agencies, legislators are better equipped to predict 
future success and areas of improvement for each program.210 The focus be-
comes how to maximize every dollar, and thus the results reflect lower spending 
with higher value returned.211 
Reality-based budgeting would discourage the use of budgetary gimmicks 
to bridge budgetary gaps.212 Conventional budgeting allocates money based on 
previous allocations and then bridges the resulting shortfall.213 In order to meet 
balanced budget requirements for that year, states may engage in one-time asset 
                                                                                                                           
 205 Williams, supra note 75. Legislators may also unwittingly give funding to agencies with di-
rectly conflicting policy activities. Id. (explaining that legislators may give money to agencies that 
devote resources in direct conflict with that lawmakers’ policy views). 
 206 Id. (stating that conventional budgeting “virtually guarantees overspending”); see Pfiffner et 
al., supra note 79, at 28 (arguing that conventional budgeting is not the best way to spend taxpayer 
dollars).  
 207 See David Osborne & Peter Hutchinson, Budgeting for Outcomes: How Government Can 
Deliver More Value for the Tax Dollars Citizens Spend, IQ REP., Nov. 2004, at 1, 8–9. 
 208 See Pfiffner et al., supra note 79, at 28. 
 209 See Osborne & Hutchinson, supra note 207, at 9. For example, in the Baltimore CitiStat initia-
tive, Mayor Martin O’Malley required every department head to give direct personal feedback every 
two weeks and held department heads accountable for solving problems, improving performance, and 
saving money. Robert D. Behn, What All Mayors Would Like to Know About Baltimore’s CitiStat 
Performance Strategy, IBM CTR. FOR BUS. OF GOV’T 7, 23 (2007), available at http://web.pdx.edu/~
stipakb/download/PerfMeasures/CitiStatPerformanceStrategy.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/DSE5-
LLPL The results were immediate: in the first year the initiative saved the city $13.6 million. Id. at 38. 
The process also saves by eliminating unnecessary layers of organization. Id. at 7. For example, the 
Iowa Department of Transportation saved $35 million annually when it eliminated offices and garag-
es, while maintaining core services by cross-training employees to handle a greater range of tasks. Id. 
at 38. 
 210 Williams, supra note 75. In addition to tools like quantitative metrics, legislators can also use 
tools like organizational strategy maps, where an organization outlines what it aims to do and how it 
plans on achieving its goals, to determine if that organization will be able to support the state’s goals. 
See Shayne C. Kavanagh et al., Anatomy of a Priority-Driven Budget Process, GOV’T FIN. OFFICERS 
ASS’N 8, http://www.gfoa.org/anatomy-priority-driven-budget-process, archived at http://perma.cc/
5BZL-RLYS. 
 211 See Williams, supra note 75. 
 212 See Pfiffner et al., supra note 79, at 27–28; Williams, supra note 75. 
 213 See Williams, supra note 75 (arguing that conventional budgeting leads to an allocation strate-
gy where few questions are asked, inevitably leading to overspending). 
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sales, fund-shifting, redefining the terms of the requirements, and other budget-
ary gimmicks.214 With reality-based budgeting, however, the focus shifts away 
from the spending-first-and-balancing-after model to funding only the most ef-
fective programs.215 In that way, reality-based budgets rely heavily on a constant 
awareness of the finite resources available and on allocating those resources 
carefully.216 
Additionally, reality-based budgeting discourages agencies from manipulat-
ing data to garner a greater share of the budget.217 Since the emphasis shifts from 
what a program needs to what the program can bring to the table, there is less 
opportunity for agencies inflate their data.218 Reality-based budgeting focuses on 
careful spending and long-term viability, eliminating the need for quick, short-
term budgetary balancing gimmicks.219 
Although steps can be taken to put the force of law behind reality-based 
budgeting, lasting change can only come with legislative support.220 Some crit-
ics object to reality-based budgeting, arguing that it is impossible to force budg-
et-makers to adhere to it.221 Balanced budget provisions, however, can be 
amended to include procedural stages that echo reality-based budgeting ideals, 
such as the creation of metrics by which to measure the effectiveness of agen-
cies.222 Nonetheless, reality-based budgeting cannot be effective unless the deci-
                                                                                                                           
 214 See id. (stating that states turn to short-term solutions, including gimmicks, to reconcile budget 
deficits after the allocations have been decided). 
 215 See Osborne & Hutchinson, supra note 207, at 8–9; Pfiffner et al., supra note 79, at 27–28; 
Williams, supra note 75. 
 216 Pfiffner et al., supra note 79, at 30. The effectiveness of this strategy is demonstrated by 
Washington State, which eliminated a $2.8 billion deficit in a year using this strategy. Id. 
 217 Luppino-Esposito, supra note 150 (outlining some of the most egregious recent examples of 
this practice); see Eucalitto, supra note 10 (highlighting some examples of this frequently used budg-
etary gimmick). Although reality-based budgeting may be criticized for shifting the emphasis from 
data regarding what agencies need to data regarding how agencies performed, in fact, the data re-
quired for reality-based budgeting is often objective and easily independently verifiable. Cf. Priorities 
and Performance Based Budgeting (PPBB), NEVADA.US 4, http://www.leg.state.nv.us/Session/
77th2013/Budgets/PPBB.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/UE23-T5T3 (last updated Dec. 18, 2014) 
(displaying the kinds of statistics and data used by the state of Nevada in evaluating various agencies 
according to reality-based budgeting). Additionally, the government, not the agencies, sets the goals, 
thus reducing the opportunity for manipulation. See id. (showing the objectives set by the governor 
and the data used to judge various agencies by those goals in Nevada).  
 218 See Williams, supra note 75. 
 219 See Purdy, supra note 111 (arguing that Washington State’s reality-based budget model uses 
only the most effective ways to address priorities and the most cost-efficient and operationally effi-
cient ways of achieving desired results). 
 220 See Pfiffner et al., supra note 79, at 27 (recommending that the legislature adopt a reality-
based budgeting model). 
 221 See Williams, supra note 75 (stating that “lazy” legislators prefer funding special interest 
groups without inquiring more about the effectiveness of that money). 
 222 See id. Although the likelihood of passing such provisions may be in question, it should be 
noted that support for this budgeting technique has come from both sides of the aisle. Id. The Demo-
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sion-makers earnestly adhere to its ideals.223 To that end, producing reality-
based-budgeting-inspired provisions encourages such thinking and may foster 
the legislative mindset necessary to make reality-based budgeting an actual reali-
ty.224 
With reality-based budgeting on the rise at the local level, it is time for 
states to correct their budgetary issues by doing the same.225 Since 2012, over 
sixty large and mid-sized communities, including cities such as Sacramento and 
Cincinnati, began using reality-based budgeting with effective and scalable re-
sults.226 Furthermore, it has proven workable on a statewide level.227 Thus far, 
most states have been slow to adopt this new method because of the creation of 
competition amongst agencies for resources.228 Yet, this very competition can be 
used to drive agencies to achieve better results.229 Additionally, states have 
balked at the notion of spending time and money to evaluate budgets in such a 
way every year, which has led new reality-based budget proposals to provide for 
multi-year or cyclical reviews to save the time and money.230 No matter what 
the final form may be for reality-based budgeting, with increasing political 
pressure for states to adopt this form of budgeting, states will soon need to 
                                                                                                                           
cratic Leadership Council has pushed for outcome-based budgeting techniques akin to reality-based 
budgeting to “[maximize] the value of each hard-earned dollar.” Id. 
 223 See generally De Pena, supra note 181 (asking state legislators to take the lead and adopt the 
priority-based budgeting mindset in their decision-making). 
 224 See Osborne & Hutchinson, supra note 207, at 8–9; Pfiffner et al., supra note 79, at 27–28; 
Williams, supra note 75. 
 225 See CTR. FOR PRIORITY BASED BUDGETING, supra note 125.  
 226 See id. (stating that the Center for Priority Based Budgeting has helped many of these commu-
nities install reality-based budgeting techniques, and describing the results as “effective,” “scalable,” 
and “repeatable”); see also SHIREY, supra note 125, at 2 (identifying the implementation of reality-
based budgeting as one of Sacramento’s successes for 2012); Priority-Driven Budgeting, CITY OF 
CINCINNATI, http://www.cincinnati-oh.gov/finance/budget/priority-driven-budgeting/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/FXZ4-9Y2L (last visited Jan. 19, 2015) (describing the priority-based budgeting plan 
of the City of Cincinnati). 
 227 See Pfiffner et al., supra note 79, at 30 (describing the state of Washington’s use of the system 
to eliminate a multi-billion dollar budget); Ronald Snell, NCSL Fiscal Brief: Zero-Base Budgeting in 
the States, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS 5–6 (Jan. 2012) http://www.ncsl.org/
documents/fiscal/zbb2012.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/4EQQ-BR77 (discussing the use and suc-
cess of a similar budgeting technique in New Hampshire and Idaho). 
 228 Cf. Snell, supra note 227, at 3 (listing reasons why states have rejected proposals for alterna-
tives to conventional budgeting in the past). 
 229 See Williams, supra note 75. 
 230 See Snell, supra note 227, at 4. Performing reality-based budgeting annually can prove to be 
an unwieldy endeavor and cost even the smallest state government billions to perform the task every 
year. See id. (describing the expenses in the similar budgeting plan of Oklahoma and Florida). Yet, 
using cyclical structures to relieve the financial pressures of annual budgeting, combined with stream-
lining the process by keeping the focus on the basic government goals can make the project a manage-
able endeavor. See De Pena, supra note 181 (describing the ways reality-based budgeting can be a 
more manageable endeavor than an annual line-by-line approval budget system); cf. Snell, supra note 
227, at 4 (stating that many states looking for alternatives to conventional budgeting also look to cy-
clical budgeting timelines to make the process more affordable).  
2015] Preventing State Balanced Budget Gimmicks 381 
reevaluate their budgetary processes in the face of growing pressure and the inef-
fectiveness of alternatives.231 
B. States Should Adopt Cyclical-Based Budgeting 
In addition to reality-based budgeting, states should also adopt cyclical 
models for their budgetary timelines.232 To that end, states should base balanced 
budget requirements around multiyear periods that are based on the economic 
cycle.233 Subsection 1 explains how having a cyclical-based structure would 
shift legislative focus to long-term economic sustainability.234 Subsection 2 then 
discusses how a cyclical-based structure prevents the use of many budgetary 
gimmicks.235 
1. Cyclical-Based Budgeting Places a Greater Emphasis on Long-Term 
Fiscal Sustainability 
The current annual model of budgeting creates problems because it forces 
budget-makers to look only at the next year, rather than into the future.236 The 
one-time sale of state assets that help cover shortfalls for the next year, but end 
up costing the state millions in generated revenue in the long run, exemplifies 
one of the problems with the annual model.237 It also leads to poor management 
of rainy-day funds because they do not serve immediate financial needs.238 Fi-
                                                                                                                           
 231 See, e.g., S. 33, 151st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2011); H. 7076, 2012 Leg., Jan. Sess. 
(R.I. 2012); see also Snell, supra note 227, at 6 (listing seventeen states of varying sizes, including 
Iowa, Kansas, Rhode Island, South Carolina, California, Georgia, Illinois, and Ohio that have had 
serious interest in alternative budgeting proposed legislation). 
 232 Geier & Beljean, supra note 104, at 5 (crediting the cyclical structure as a model for success-
ful budgeting and citing its success in Switzerland). 
 233 See SWISS CONST. art. 26 (providing a template for how a cyclical system would operate); 
Geier, supra note 102, at 12–13 (describing a possible model of a cyclically-based budget structure); 
see also Federal Finance Administration, supra note 106, at 97 (showing how the Swiss model of 
cyclical structure last for approximately three years). 
 234 See infra notes 236–249 and accompanying text. 
 235 See infra notes 250–255 and accompanying text. 
 236 See Beyond the Annual Budget: Global Experiences with Medium Term Expenditure Frame-
works, THE WORLD BANK 7 (2013), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/seminars/eng/2013/
fiscalpolicy/pdf/brumby.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/Y8E8-A42T. (explaining the shortcomings of 
annual budgeting, including short-sightedness). 
 237 See Costello et al., supra note 168, at 7 (explaining the damaging effects of selling state assets 
to cover current budget issues, including the loss of future funds). 
 238 See Gamage, supra note 11, at 767 (describing states’ poor management of rainy-day funds); 
see also Brian Galle & Kirk J. Stark, Beyond Bailouts: Federal Tools for Preventing State Budget 
Crises, 87 IND. L.J. 599, 612 (2012) (arguing that when lawmakers are not obligated to contribute to 
rainy-day funds, they tend not to do so). 
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nally, the annual model also tends to aggravate recessions, as inflexibility in def-
icit spending leads to fiscal tightening that worsens economic conditions.239 
The cyclical model resolves many of these problems by focusing on long-
term economic sustainability.240 Because a cyclical model would allow states to 
take on debt during a recession, states would no longer feel the pressure to make 
poor long-term decisions for short-term gain.241 For example, the strategy of 
selling state assets for a quick infusion of cash would no longer be necessary 
because states would have more breathing room during recessions and could 
instead use the future income from those assets to repay deficits during an eco-
nomic boom.242 The cyclical model also creates a buffer for the uncertainty as-
sociated with unplanned revenues and expenditures that frequently occur 
throughout the fiscal year.243 Finally, the cyclical model promotes better man-
agement of rainy-day funds.244 
Although the cycle-based structure helps alleviate many of the problems 
facing state budgets, it comes at a price.245 One problem is that legislators have 
difficulty adequately preparing for the cyclical changes, as it is challenging to 
predict when such change is coming.246 Although it is impossible to remove this 
                                                                                                                           
 239 David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2611 (2005) (echo-
ing the macroeconomic theory that raising taxes and cutting spending during a recession, common 
traits of the annual model, are not an effective means of recovery); John T. Harvey, The Great Reces-
sion: How We Got Here (and How to Get Out), FORBES, Oct. 7, 2011, http://www.forbes.com/sites/
johntharvey/2011/10/07/the-great-recession/, archived at http://perma.cc/7RED-5NFA (explaining 
that heavy government spending is the best method of economic recovery during recession); see N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 52:27BBB-44.1 (West 2010 & Supp. 2014) (providing economic stimulus packages to 
revitalize economically depressed areas). 
 240 See Gamage, supra note 11, at 766 (explaining the difference between how politicians handle 
their state’s budget and the economic realities surrounding it and concluding that proper state use of 
surpluses by saving them for later use during downturns would be a successful method of solving state 
volatility problems). 
 241 See, e.g., Gamage, supra note 11, at 766 (explaining states’ problems with effectively creating 
and using rainy-day funds); Costello et al., supra note 168, at 7 (outlining the dangers of states’ one-
time sales of assets, including the loss of future funds and selling the property far beneath its worth); 
Eucalitto, supra note 10 (outlining various examples of state officials manipulating the calendar to 
undermine balanced budget requirements). 
 242 See Costello et al., supra note 168, at 7 (explaining the harmful effects of selling state proper-
ties to cover annual shortfalls). 
 243 See Geier, supra note 102, at 20 (noting how the cyclical method is more effective than an 
annual model in reacting to unexpected revenues and expenditures). 
 244 See Geier & Beljean, supra note 104, at 121 (explaining how the Swiss cyclical structure was 
able to rein in the temptation to spend extra funds during economic booms and instead put them aside 
for the future); see also Governor Gregoire’s Rainy Day Fund Proposal: Potential Benefits and Seri-
ous Limitations, WASH. STATE BUDGET & POLICY CTR. (Jan. 2007), http://budgetandpolicy.org/
reports/governor-gregoire2019s-rainy-day-fund-proposal-potential-benefits-and-serious-limitations/
pdf_version, archived at http://perma.cc/4YHH-VMPX (explaining the connection between rainy-day 
funds and temporary cyclical deficits). 
 245 See Gamage, supra note 11, at 756. 
 246 Jon David Vasché & Brad Williams, Revenue Volatility in California, 36 ST. TAX NOTES 35, 
40 (2005) (explaining the difficulty of predicting economic cycle movements); see Gamage, supra 
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uncertainty, the cyclical model does promote behavior that allows for lawmakers 
to prepare for the future changes, whenever they occur.247 Despite this shift to 
longer term planning, budgetary revisions can give legislators the freedom need-
ed to react to urgent short-term needs whenever necessary.248 Continuing to con-
tribute to rainy-day funds while dampening the effects of a recession through 
spending would be a much more effective and practical balanced-budget 
mechanism that will strengthen and provide stability to the state’s economy.249 
2. Cyclical-Based Systems Prevent Gimmicks 
The cyclical-based structure can also remove some of the budgetary gim-
micks that the annual structure permits states to abuse.250 States would no longer 
be able to transfer funds from one year to another to create the illusion of a bal-
anced budget.251 Since there is no longer pressure to balance the budget annual-
ly, lawmakers could focus less on moving money around and more on dealing 
with what the financial status of the state actually looks like over the course of 
the cycle.252 The cyclical structure also discourages putting off payments until 
the following year.253 This tactic would be less useful as the postponement 
would often last for a substantial period of time in order to cross into the next 
cycle.254 Thus, cyclical budgeting is preferable to an annual system because it 
discourages state budgetary gimmicks that mask the very problems balanced 
budget requirements seek to prevent.255 
                                                                                                                           
note 11, at 756 (hypothesizing that politicians would have prepared differently had they known about 
the impending economic downturns of 2000 or 2007); see also Ronald K. Snell, State Experiences 
with Annual and Biannual Budgeting, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS 6–7 (Apr. 2011), 
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/fiscal/BiennialBudgeting_May2011.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
B6UC-N4YF (describing the problem between a biennial budget and an annual budget lying in the 
difference between predicting the next twelve months and the next thirty, as biennial predictions had 
twice as high of an average error than annual predictions).  
 247 See Geier & Beljean, supra note 104, at 7 (explaining how cyclical models can help encourage 
the proper use of funds for future planning during boom times). 
 248 Snell, supra note 246, at 7. 
 249 See Harvey, supra note 239 (arguing for the necessity of increased governmental spending for 
economic recession). 
 250 See supra notes 159–176 and accompanying text. 
 251 See Eucalitto, supra note 10 (describing the “calendar games” employed by states, such as 
shifting funds from year to year to create the illusion of balance). 
 252 See Gamage, supra note 11, at 766 (explaining the difference between how politicians handle 
their states budget and the economic realities surrounding it). 
 253 See ITA, The Truth About Balanced Budgets, supra note 12, at 31 (discussing states’ habits of 
failing to pay vendor bills to aid budget balancing); see also Teachers Ret. Bd. v. Genest, 65 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 326, 350–51 (Ct. App. 2007) (deciding that the government’s failure to pay into schoolteach-
er pension fund warranted a remedy of $7,000). 
 254 See ITA, The Truth of Balanced Budgets, supra note 12, at 26. 
255 See generally id. (describing the litany of balanced budget issues caused by manipulating the 
annual system, such as fund shifting and payment delays).  
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C. Stricter Enforcement Models Could Discourage Harmful  
Behavior By Lawmakers 
Although reality-based budgeting and cyclical models can ameliorate many 
of the problems faced by state budgets, stricter enforcement is also necessary to 
ensure responsibility and accountability in the budgetary process.256 A major 
problem with state balanced budget requirements is the lack of effective en-
forcement mechanisms to make politicians take them seriously or to discourage 
politicians from abusing the process through gimmicks.257 By amending current 
balanced budget requirements to have an independent state agency provide over-
sight and impose individual liability for egregious conduct, states can better en-
sure that politicians will respect the budgetary process.258 Subsection 1 describes 
how an independent state agency could enforce balanced budget provisions.259 
Subsection 2 offers an additional enforcement mechanism in personal liability 
provisions for lawmakers who violate the requirements.260 
1. Independent State Agencies Should Oversee and Enforce State Budgetary 
Processes 
By granting certain powers to independent state agencies, legislatures can 
create enforcement measures to discourage budgetary abuses.261 Having an in-
dependent body provide recommended interpretations of the language of the 
balanced budget provisions can discourage lawmakers from manipulating termi-
nology, such as fund-sweeping and redefining revenue to include debt.262 It can 
also provide persuasive authority for courts if interpretative questions arise.263 
Furthermore, arming independent state agencies with investigative powers can 
promote transparency in the budget process and discourage strategies detri-
                                                                                                                           
 256 See infra notes 261–284 and accompanying text. 
 257 See, e.g., ITA, The Truth About Balanced Budgets, supra note 12, at 27 (detailing the “word 
games” played by states to avoid or undermine the spirit of balanced budget requirements); Eucalitto, 
supra note 10 (outlining various examples of state officials manipulating the calendar to undermine 
balanced budget requirements); The Section 25 Budget “Loophole,” supra note 170, at 7 (providing 
an example of a state failing to pay Medicaid payments to health care providers to create appearance 
of balanced budget). 
 258 See infra notes 261–284 and accompanying text. 
 259 See infra notes 261–275 and accompanying text. 
 260 See infra notes 276–284 and accompanying text. 
 261 See Fabbrini, supra note 134, at 24–28 (examining how the presence of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union was an effective mechanism for driving the acceptance of stronger balanced 
budget standards for many member states). 
 262 See ITA, The Truth About Balanced Budgets, supra note 12, at 27–28 (explaining how politi-
cians rely on the vagaries of the requirements to utilize these gimmicks). 
 263 See Wein v. State, 347 N.E.2d 586, 589 (N.Y. 1976) (utilizing similar persuasive authority 
when considering the comptroller’s report in balance budget provision interpretation issue). 
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mental to taxpayers.264 Finally, granting an independent agency sanctioning 
power over the state should it continuously fail to meet balanced budget re-
quirements creates force behind such provisions.265 
Some states, by giving existing agencies more power, would create effec-
tive budget oversight mechanisms.266 For example, California’s State Auditor 
allows state employees and anyone seeking to engage in business with the state 
to report significant waste or misuse of state resources, including funds and 
property, as well as misconduct, incompetency, or inefficiency by state employ-
ees.267 Currently, however, California’s policy stops short of investigating mem-
bers of the legislative branch, including budget-makers.268 
Despite some difficulties with enacting this kind of enforcement, because it 
requires legislative approval, the current political atmosphere provides opportu-
nities to overcome such challenges.269 Predictably, legislators would be reluctant 
                                                                                                                           
 264 See Dirk Niepelt & Cristoph A. Schaltegger, The Swiss Debt Brake—Ten Years On, 149 
SWISS J. OF ECON. & STAT. 111, 111–12 (2013) (noting the important role that public awareness and 
pressure have played in increasing political accountability, which has acted as an effective enforce-
ment mechanism in the Swiss system). 
 265 See Eucalitto, supra note 10 (concluding that the strength of balanced budgetary requirements 
are only as powerful as the willingness of the politicians to obey them). Such sanctioning power could 
be crafted after models that provide for multiple chances to meet certain budgetary standards before 
automatic sanctions are administered. See Fiscal Compact, supra note 129, art. 8 (affording member 
states multiple chances to meet budgetary standards before sanction is applied). In addition to provid-
ing increased incentives to meet the standards, the threat of sanctions would highlight failures and in-
crease political pressure for results. See Frank Marty & Martin Weder, Debt Brake: A Mechanism for 
Sustainable Success, 18 ECONOMIESUISSE 1, 2 (2012) (crediting the public support for the program as 
its main enforcement mechanism); Klaus Wille & Matthias Wabl, Swiss ‘Debt Brake’ Generates Sur-
plus as Greece Battles Deficit, BLOOMBERG, Apr. 29, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-
04-29/swiss-debt-brake-generates-surplus-as-greek-deficit-leads-to-junk-rating.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/JVW4-AF33 (arguing that the direct democracy system is a key way of keeping politi-
cians accountable). 
 266 See, e.g., Mission and Philosophy, CAL. STATE AUDITOR (2013), http://www.bsa.ca.gov/
aboutus/mission, archived at http://perma.cc/WQ2G-2UCH; The Budget Process, IND. STATE BUDG-
ET AGENCY, http://www.in.gov/sba/2372.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/EQJ7-AFUQ (last visited 
Jan. 19, 2015). 
 267 Frequently Asked Questions, CAL. STATE AUDITOR (2013) http://www.bsa.ca.gov/hotline/
faqs, archived at http://perma.cc/7B85-AL9Z. 
 268 Id. (stating definitively that the California State Auditor does not investigate members of the 
legislative branch of the government). Even without investigating the legislative branch, the California 
State Auditor found hundreds of thousands of misspent taxpayer money, including an agency spend-
ing $64,666 on circumventing bidding procedures and an agency manager costing the state $12,379 
by using state vehicles for personal use. Patrick McGreevy, California Taxpayers’ Money Wasted, 
Misused, State Auditor Finds, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jan/19/
local/la-me-0119-waste-20110119, archived at http://perma.cc/F6HL-APYX.  
 269 Cf. Duncan Murray, Term Limits for Congress: How Can We Do It, STANDARD-EXAMINER 
(Nov. 5, 2013), https://web.archive.org/web/20131110232700/http://www.standard.net/stories/2013/
11/01/term-limits-congress-how-we-can-do-it, archived at https://perma.cc/9SFD-GXV7 (using the 
question of Congressional term-limits to illustrate the difficulty in convincing legislators to limit 
themselves in a significant way). By expanding its jurisdiction to include investigating budgetary mis-
conduct amongst legislators, an independent agency could become an effective force. See Fabbrini, su-
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to limit themselves in such a drastic measure.270 Although such a roadblock is 
daunting, it is not insurmountable.271 Emanating from the recession, the current 
political atmosphere is charged with a debate about the fiscal responsibility of 
government.272 With the movement for stronger budgetary accountability, the 
time is ripe for such change.273 Additionally, the referendum process could be 
used to effectuate increased budgetary enforcement.274 Although there are practi-
cal challenges to creating an independent agency charged with oversight, such 
change is critical to ensuring that balanced budgeting requirements are met.275 
2. Imposing Personal Liability on State Officials Could Deter Egregious 
Budgetary Misconduct 
States adopting and enforcing sanctions against individual authorities that 
knowingly committed egregious misconduct in the budgetary process would also 
be effective in discouraging abuses.276 The threat of personal liability would dis-
courage politicians from abusing the budgetary process to better their public im-
age.277 The most serious and obvious budgetary abuses, such as intentionally 
                                                                                                                           
pra note 134, at 9–18 (showcasing the effectiveness of independent budgetary enforcement in the 
EU). One major problem would be the delicate separation of powers between the legislative and exec-
utive branches that many states have set for their budgetary process, and requiring these enforcement 
methods runs the risk of upsetting the balance and could require statutory or even constitutional 
amendments to become permissive. See generally NCSL Executive Summary, supra note 37 (outlin-
ing some of the separation of powers concerns between the executive and legislative branches in state 
governments regarding the budgetary process). But see Judy v. Schaefer, 627 A.2d 1039, 1050–51 
(Md. 1993) (holding that the executive branch’s expanding role into the budgetary process did not 
constitute a violation of separation of powers).  
 270 See Murray, supra note 269. 
 271 See Nichols, supra note 19, at 584 (predicting that public demand for increased fiscal respon-
sibility will lead to changes that were previously thought impossible, such as a federal balanced budg-
et amendment). 
 272 See Greenblatt, supra note 19 (reporting on the new effort by Republicans to get a balanced 
budget amendment in the federal Constitution in response to public outcry about overspending). 
 273 See id. 
 274 See Stephen Shapiro, The Referendum Process in Maryland: Balancing Respect for Repre-
sentative Government with the Right to Direct Democracy, 44 U. BALT. L.F. 1, 8 (2013) (explaining 
the benefits of a referendum process, including passing publicly popular bills that the legislature could 
not handle and giving a public check on the legislative action). See generally Peter Siegenthaler, Les-
sons from the History and Challenges for the Future of the Debt Brake: A Note, 149 SWISS J. OF 
ECON. & STAT. 137 (2013) (arguing that public legitimization is necessary for a successful balanced 
budget system and credits the Swiss direct democracy procedure as a model for success). 
275 Cf. Fabbrini, supra note 134, at 21–28 (exploring how enforcement mechanisms were a criti-
cal part of the EU’s fiscal policy). 
 276 See George A. Bermann, Integrating Governmental and Officer Tort Liability, 77 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1175, 1197 (1977) (discussing the benefits of personal liability of public officials for egregious 
misconduct). 
 277 See id. (identifying the deterrence capabilities of personal liability for public officials). 
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failing to provide promised pensions and gross misuse of directed funds, would 
be deterred.278 
This solution comes with potential drawbacks.279 One problem is the diffi-
culty in getting such provisions enacted and enforced.280 Another problem is that 
it limits the ability of state actors to perform necessary duties in extraordinary 
circumstances.281 Specifying the type of conduct that would be covered under 
the provision can ameliorate this problem.282 Specifically, in order to give offi-
cials flexibility, the personal responsibility sanction should protect only against 
the more egregious budgetary misconduct, such as gross budgetary mismanage-
ment and continuous serious abuse of budgetary gimmicks.283 Although not a 
perfect solution, this enforcement mechanism can help prevent the outer bounds 
of misconduct and provide relief for egregious behavior from public servants.284 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the presence of balanced budget requirements, states have strug-
gled to maintain balanced budgets. As most states face multi-billion dollar defi-
cits, they simply have been unable to bridge those gaps. These major shortfalls 
are symptoms of underlying fundamental problems in states’ balanced budget 
requirements. Lack of enforcement, rampant reliance on budgetary gimmicks, 
and encouragement of shortsighted “quick fixes” undermine the goal of balanced 
budget requirements: to achieve long-term fiscal responsibility and sustainabil-
ity. 
Implementing several structural changes to these balanced budget require-
ments can ameliorate many of these problems. Greater use of reality-based 
                                                                                                                           
 278 See id. (arguing that personal liability works best as a deterrent when it is applied against wan-
ton and willful misconduct). 
 279 See Evan J. Mandery, Qualified Immunity or Absolute Impunity? The Moral Hazards of Ex-
tending Qualified Immunity to Lower-Level Public Officials, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 479, 498 
(1994) (discussing the risks of extending personal liability for public officials, such as over-
deterrence). 
 280 See Murray, supra note 269. This is a similar problem, with a similar solution, to the problem 
facing independent state agency enforcement discussed above. See supra notes 261–275 and accom-
panying text (outlining the strategy and limitations of independent state agency enforcement of bal-
anced budget requirements). 
 281 See Lauren Oren, Immunity and Accountability in Civil Rights Litigation: Who Should Pay? 
50 U. PITT. L. REV. 935, 937 (1989) (discussing how the common law roots of qualified immunity for 
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 282 See Bermann, supra note 276, at 1197 (concluding that personal liability for public officials 
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 283 See The Section 25 Budget “Loophole,” supra note 170, at 7 (providing an example of egre-
gious misconduct of public officials refusing to adhere to promises to pay pensions); CAMPAIGN FOR 
TOBACCO-FREE KIDS, supra note 1, at i (discussing the rampant misuse of funds from the 1998 To-
bacco Settlement). 
284 See Bermann, supra note 276, at 1197.  
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budgeting can encourage better budgetary decision-making and eliminate many 
incentives for common abuses. Cyclical-based timelines prioritizes long-term 
planning over shortsightedness and provide states with the flexibility necessary 
to respond to the natural fluctuations of economic cycles. Finally, stricter en-
forcement mechanisms, such as independent state agency watchdogs and impos-
ing personal liability on public officials for egregious abuse, can encourage 
proper behavior by budget authorities. By implementing these changes, states 
can speed up their economic recoveries and set themselves up for future success. 
These improvements can tilt the scales in their favor so that they can finally 
achieve balance. 
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